SUBSTITUTION SCHOLIA AND THUCYDIDES' USE OF PREPOSITIONS

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this essay is to resuscitate an ancient method of philological explanation.   The method in question will be familiar to readers of the scholia to almost any classical author.   It consists of glossing a troublesome word as a substitute for some other word of related meaning.   The method is exemplified by the following glosses:

> *Iliad* 5.694: ἐκ δ' ἄρα οἱ μηροῦ δόρυ μείλινον ὧσε θύραζε.—κυρίως μὲν ἔξω τῆς θύρας, νῦν δὲ κεῖται ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔξω.
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> Servius in *Aeneid* 1.156: flectit equos curruque volans dat lora secundo.— quidam *flectit* pro *regit* accipiunt.

It will prove useful to recount the origin of my interest in these glosses, since that has left a considerable mark on the present essay. My interest arose from a concern with Thucydides' use of prepositions. Difficulties in understanding Thucydides' text are often caused by doubt over the intended meaning of a preposition.   This is best exemplified in the case of Thucydides 2.90.1–4, a vexed passage concerning one of Phormio's naval victories.   It is a symptom of the difficulty of this passage that Grote devoted an appendix of four pages to discussing it in his history—this without settling the controversy.   It will be seen below that the controversy turns on the interpretation of *epi* with the accusative.

When I began studying Thucydides' prepositional phrases, I was familiar only with the modern approach to prepositions and envisioned my project as a detailed application of this approach to Thucydidean usage.   The modern approach consists in identifying each preposition's

"basic, spatial meaning" and in discovering a metaphorical relationship to this meaning in every usage that apparently departs from it. After much study on the basis of this approach, I grew somewhat disenchanted with it. It did not prove capable of providing clear explanations for those Thucydidean passages, like 2.90.1–4, whose obscurity had made the topic of Thucydidean prepositional phrases seem worth studying in the first place.

At this point, I became acquainted with the substitution scholia exemplified above. They seemed to provide a method of interpreting some, at least, of the phrases for which the modern approach had proved inadequate. This discovery, however, brought a new difficulty with it. The ancient method of explanation by substitution had been specifically rejected by Lehrs and had lain abandoned ever since. Therefore, before this method might be used freely, it was necessary to demonstrate its validity in the face of a long-standing presumption that it was worthless.

This essay is an attempt to make that demonstration. In it, I have drawn my basic data from Thucydides' use of prepositions and have examined the ancient and modern approaches to prepositional phrases in some detail. This procedure is merely a reflection of the origin of my interest in the substitution scholia. Another author, whether Greek or Latin, or another part of speech would have served equally well. The essay is not in essence concerned with Thucydides' text or with prepositions, but rather with proving the assertion that explanations by substitution are sometimes a valid and useful complement to the more abstract explanations of modern philology. This assertion is, I believe, relevant to the interpretation of virtually every ancient author and to the theoretical study of language as well.

I. THE MODERN APPROACH

In this essay, I refer, for the sake of brevity, to the "modern approach." By this I mean a set of assumptions about the meaning of prepositional phrases in classical Greek that occurred in an essentially complete form for the first time in Kühner's *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache* (Hannover 1869) and has dominated studies in this

area since then.   Here are the crucial excerpts from Kühner's grammar:

> (pp. 388–89) Die ursprüngliche Bedeutung der Präpositionen besteht in der Bezeichnung des räumlichen Dimensionsverhältnisses. . . . Die räumlichen Beziehungen werden zunächst auf die Zeit übertragen.   Denn die Verhältnisse der Zeit wurden ursprünglich ganz auf dieselbe Weise wie die des Raumes betrachtet. . . . Die räumlichen Beziehungen werden drittens auf die Kausalität und die Art und Weise übertragen in dem auch diese Verhältnisse auf sinnliche Weise als Raumverhältnisse angeschaut werden. . . .
> (p. 391) Jede Präposition hat Eine Grundbedeutung die sie überall festhält; und wenn auch eine Präposition mit zwei oder drei Kasus verbunden wird, so bleibt doch überall dieselbe Grundbedeutung; sie erhält aber nach den verschiedenen Kasus, insofern jeder Kasus eine besondere Bedeutung hat, verschiedene Modifikationen.   Die Grundbedeutung tritt am Reinsten in der Ortsbeziehungen . . . hervor. . . . (p. 445) Sammtliche eigentliche Präpositionen sind ursprünglich Ortsadverbien.

Other grammars depart only in detail from these premisses, e.g., Smyth-Messing, *Greek Grammar* (Harvard 1956) 365:

> All prepositions seem to have been adverbs originally and most adverbs of place; as adverbs they are case forms.   Several are locatives, as *peri*.   The prepositions express primarily notions of space, then notions of time, and finally are used in figurative relations to denote cause, agency, means, manner, etc., . . .   The prepositions define the character of the verbal action and set forth the relations of an oblique case to the predicate with greater precision than is possible for the cases without a preposition.[1]

The modern approach may be analyzed into four different ideas about the nature and meaning of prepositional phrases: (1) prepositions were originally adverbs; (2) each preposition has one basic meaning; (3) the secondary meanings of each preposition are transferred or metaphorical applications of the basic meaning; (4) the basic meaning of each preposition is spatial, while its secondary meanings are temporal and abstract in that order.

The idea that prepositions were originally adverbs entered the mainstream of classical philology with Curtius' *Griechische Grammatik* (Prague 1855) 202: "Alle präpositionen waren ursprünglich Adverbien."   The idea was one of the early fruits of the development of

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[1] Cf. also E. Schwyzer, *Griechische Grammatik* (hereafter "Schwyzer") 2.430–31, and J. Humbert, *Syntaxe Grecque* 298.

comparative grammar.   Specifically, Curtius seems to have depended
on a paper by Ludwig Lange, "Andeutungen über Zeil und Methode
der syntaktischen Forschung," *Verhandlung der Göttinger Philologenver-
sammlung* (1852) 104 ff.[2]   Lange arrived at the conclusion that prep-
ositions were originally adverbs by comparing the incidence of their
adverbial use as opposed to their use in juxtaposition in Vedic literature
with the incidence of the same in the *Iliad*.   He showed that there was
a marked increase in the use of prepositions in juxtaposition in the
later work, the *Iliad*, and a comparable decrease in the adverbial use of
prepositions.

The assertion that Greek prepositions were originally adverbs has no
direct bearing on the interpretation of prepositional phrases in classical
texts.   Its relevance arises from the fact that modern philologists have
been led by this assertion to interpret prepositions as if they always
remained essentially adverbs.   Thus the meaning of a prepositional
phrase is taken as the sum of its parts: the lexical meaning of the prep-
osition-adverb; the lexical meaning of the noun object; the meaning
of the case of the noun.   This analytic approach is necessary to maintain
the second assumption of the modern approach, i.e., that despite ap-
pearances each preposition retains one basic meaning.   Apparent dif-
ferences in meaning are imputed to differences in the case of the object.
If the case is the same, then it is said to represent different Indo-European
cases.   Schwyzer (2.527), for example, distinguishes between *hupo* with
the ablative-genitive and *hupo* with the true genitive.

Despite differences in nuance, it is usually easy to see the one basic
meaning that underlies the use of an adverb.   A glance at a lexicon
will verify, for example, that the adverbs *apóthen* and *katô* are much
more restricted in meaning than the corresponding prepositions.   It
might accordingly be supposed that the notion that prepositions, like
adverbs, have one basic meaning apiece originated with the discovery
that prepositions were originally adverbs.   In fact, this notion goes back
to 1588 and the publication in Rome of Devarius' *De Particulis*.

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[2] Curtius does not acknowledge sources in his grammar but cf. his *Grundzuge der
Griechischen Etymologie* (Leipzig 1879) 38: "Vielmehr steht es fest, dass die Präpositionen
sammtlich ursprünglich Richtungsadverbien waren. . . . Was wir hier über die Ent-
wicklung der Präpositionen bemerkten hat Ludwig Lange . . . genauer ausgefuhrt."
Curtius' reference is to the article by Lange that is cited above.

Devarius' work, which dealt with conjunctions and prepositions in addition to what are called particles today, was written as a corrective to Budé's *Commentarii Graecae Linguae* (Paris 1548), the basic work on Greek usage at that time. Budé's approach to prepositions and other multiple-meaning words in the *Commentarii* had been atomistic, a compilation of scholia to particular passages.

Here is the crucial passage from Devarius' introduction. He has said that for many reasons, such as ellipsis, prepositions, conjunctions, etc. frequently appear to have many different meanings:

cum tamen ex suppletione ejus quod deest, aut repetitione, vel etiam figuratae cujusdam locutionis conversione (quibus in hoc commentario ad vindicandum cujusque particulae nativum sensum veluti quibusdam instrumentis utar) appareat singulas unam certam habere notionem, quam perpetuo in oratione qualibet quadam ex parte retineant. Quamquam, ut supra dictum est, nonnullae aliquantum a sua primaria et nativa significatione deflectunt.

De Particulis was influential. It was reprinted three times: London, 1657; Amsterdam, 1712; Nurenberg, 1718. It was considered the major work on the topic of Greek particles as late as 1772.[3]

The idea that the secondary meanings of each preposition are transferred or metaphorical applications of the basic meaning also derives from Devarius' work. It is seen, for example, in the reference to the "conversion of whatever kind of figurative expression" in the excerpt quoted above.

It might be noted that the idea that prepositions are commonly used metaphorically would have seemed bizarre, if it had not been for the ancient idea that language in general makes up for deficiencies in its vocabulary by means of catachresis or the use of metaphors to designate things that have no proper name of their own. This idea is implicit in Aristotle's treatment of metaphors.[4] It is worked out explicitly for

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[3] J. E. I. Walch, *Introductio in Linguam Graecam* (Jena 1772) 132: "fuere idcirco, qui data opera de particulis graecae linguae exponerent earumque verum usum ex priscis scriptoribus eruere studerent.   Quo in argumento admodum feliciter versatus est Matth. Devarius. . . . Post Devarium copiosum de particulis commentarium scripsit Hoogeevenius (Delphi 1768)."

[4] *Poetics* 1457B28–30.

the first time by Cicero,[5] and is still current among linguists.[6] There
is, however, no mention in antiquity of prepositions being used meta-
phorically.

The space-time-abstraction matrix, which is everywhere apparent in
the modern approach, originates, as might be suspected, with Kant's
assertion in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that space and time are the
"primary intuitions" of the human mind.   One of Kant's students was
the classicist, Gottfried Hermann.   In an early, influential essay, *de
emendanda ratione grammaticae Graecae* (Leipzig 1801), he recommended
a more philosophic, i.e., Kantian, approach to grammar.   This pro-
gram was carried out for grammar in general by Karl Becker in *Organism*
(sic) *der Sprache* (Frankfurt 1827).   Becker deduced the characteristics—
the parts of speech and so forth—of known languages from the logical
exigencies of making any statement.   Kühner acknowledged Becker's
influence and, even apart from this, it is obvious that Becker's treatment
of prepositions in general is the forerunner of the modern approach to
Greek prepositions.   Here, for example, is what Becker says on page
212:

> Die Bezeichnung der Räumverhaltnisse . . . macht die Grundbedeutung
> aller eigentlichen Präpositionen aus: weil aber in der Sprache nicht nur die
> objectiven Zeitverhältnisse und die kausalen Verhältnisse sondern auch die
> ergänzenden objectiven Verhältnisse unter das Räumverhältniss gestellt
> werden: so werden auch diese Beziehungen sehr häufig durch Präposi-
> tionen bezeichnet.

2. THE ANCIENT APPROACH

The modern approach has gradually evolved out of a combination
of ideas that originated severally in renaissance philology, comparative
grammar, and rationalistic philosophy.   It has great value in explaining

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[5] *de oratore* 3.38.155: *tertius ille modus transferendi verbi late patet quem necessitas genuit
inopia coacta et angustiis, post autem iucunditas delectatioque celebravit. . . . Nam gemmare vitis
luxuriem esse in herbis, laetas segetes etiam rustici dicunt.   Quod enim declarari vix verbo
proprio potest, id translato cum est dictum, inlustrat id, quod intelligi volumus, eius rei, quam
alieno verbo posuimus, similitudo.*

[6] E.g. G. Bonfante and J. Whatmough, "Semantics in Linguistics," *Encyclopaedia Bri-
tannica* (Chicago 1964) 20.201: "All language is a living metaphor, which is not noticed
precisely because metaphor is so amalgamated into it that it appears natural and inevit-
able."

the variety of uses to which prepositions are put. It is difficult to imagine how one could understand Greek prepositions without noting, for example, that the idea of egression in space suggests succession in time and, abstractly, causality. Still, the modern approach is vulnerable to one general criticism: it does not take into account ancient opinion on the use and meaning of prepositions. In fact, there is no ancient authority for any of the modern approach's central assertions.

Scholiasts' Treatment of Word Usage

There are occasional references to prepositions by ancient authors who dealt with language and grammar abstractly, e.g., Aristotle, Dionysius of Thrace, Apollonius Dyscolus. They cast little light, however, on ancient methods of interpreting particular, obscure prepositional phrases. For information on this topic, it is necessary to turn to the work of practical grammarians directly concerned with explicating classical texts. Their work survives chiefly in the scholia to various authors and particularly in the scholia to the *Iliad*. The *Iliad*-scholia lend themselves to our investigation not only because of their amplitude, but also because most of their grammatical glosses derive from the commentaries of Aristarchus. In working with typical grammatical glosses from these scholia, one is reasonably certain that the principles that they imply are those of early Alexandrian philology.

Discussions of word usage in the *Iliad*-scholia are based primarily on the distinction between the proper, *kurion*, use of a word and various deviant uses.

The precise meaning of the term, *kurion*, shifts with its context. For example, *kurion* frequently means the same as "proper (name)" in English. In this usage, which does not concern us directly, *kurion* stands in contrast to patronymics, e.g., to *Iliad* 1.307 and 12.129, and epithets, e.g., to 2.461, 532, 592; 3.445; 5.39.

Elsewhere, *kurion* is equivalent to "literal" in English. In this sense, the *kurion* meaning of a work is determined by quasi-etymological analysis. The method recalls Plato's discussion of word meaning in the *Cratylus*, but is typically less fanciful. A gloss to 5.196 defines ἐρεπτό-μενοι: κυρίως ἀπὸ τῆς ἔρας λαμβάνοντες, οὕτω γὰρ δηλοῖ διαιρουμ-ένη ἡ λέξις. ("Properly 'taking from the earth'; for that is what the

means when analyzed.") The scholiast interprets the verb as a conflation of the rare term for earth, *era*, and the verb, *haptesthai*.

In other cases, the *kurion* use of a word is simply asserted. Like our term, "proper," *kurion* in these glosses seems to be applied to the preferred usage among respected authors. Such glosses recall Prodicus' discussion of near synonyms in Plato's *Protagoras*. For example, a gloss to 3.183 asserts that the verb, *damaô*, which Homer has used with the Achaeans as the direct object, applies properly, *kuriôs*, to dumb animals.

The *kurion*, "literal" or "proper," use of a word is most frequently contrasted either with its metaphorical (*metaphorikon*) or with its catachrestic (*katachrêstikon*) use. The latter two terms are used in the scholia in approximately the same way that we use them today. A word is said to be used metaphorically when there is some meaningful point of comparison between that which the word literally or properly designates and that to which it is applied in the verse under consideration. For example, in 2.670 Homer says of two wealthy warriors that Zeus had showered (*katecheue*) riches on them. The gloss to this line reads:

ἡ διπλῆ, ὅτι Πίνδαρος κυρίως δέδεκται χρυσὸν ὗσαι τὸν Δία, Ὁμήρου μεταφορᾷ κεχρημένου διὰ τοῦ κατέχευε πρὸς ἔμφασιν τοῦ πλούτου.

("The line is daggered with the comment that Pindar portrayed Zeus literally raining gold"—cf. *Olympian* 7.50—"while Homer employed metaphor in his use of *katecheue* to emphasize the amount of wealth.")

A word is said to be used catachrestically or "misused" chiefly when its deviation from its literal or proper meaning seems caused by a deficiency in vocabulary rather than by the desire for some special effect. Thus catachresis is typically alleged in instances where some rather unusual situation is being described. For example, 18.336 and 7, where Achilles is speaking, with its gloss reads:

δώδεκα δὲ προπάροιθε πυρῆς ἀποδειροτομήσω
Τρώων ἀγλαὰ τέκνα . . .—κυρίως ἡ τῶν ἀλόγων, παρόσον
ἐκεῖθεν ἐκδέρονται, καταχρηστικῶς δὲ νῦν.

("I'll slit the gullets of twelve lovely Trojan youths before the pyre . . .—Properly the slaughter of beasts, since they are skinned starting from there, sc., the neck; but the term is used catachrestically in this passage.")

The implication is that Homer did not use the verb, *apodeirotomesô*, metaphorically to draw attention to the similarity between human and animal sacrifice, but rather misused the verb because he lacked a proper term for human sacrifice.   The same rationale is apparent in the use of the term, catachrestic, in, for example, glosses to 4.3 and 13.429.

A third sort of usage, which has not become a commonplace in modern philology, is contrasted with *kurion* usage in the *Iliad* scholia. In some glosses, one word is said to be used "as a substitute for," *anti*, another word.   This is not merely another way of designating metaphor or catachresis, as an examination of a few such glosses will show.

5.694:   ἐκ δ' ἄρα οἱ μηροῦ δόρυ μειλίνον ὦσε θύραζε.
—κυρίως μὲν ἔξω τῆς θύρας, νῦν δὲ κεῖται ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔξω.

("He pushed the dark spear outdoors his thigh.—Properly 'out of the door,' but here it occurs as a substitute for 'out of.'")

7.446–47:   τίς ἐστι βροτῶν ἐπ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν
             ὅς τις ἔτ' ἀθανάτοισι νόον καὶ μῆτιν ἐνίψει.
—κυρίως μὲν ἐπιπλήξει διὰ λόγων, νῦν δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐρεῖ καὶ λέξει.

("Who is there of mortal men upon the infinite earth who will rebuke his mind and purpose to immortals?—Properly 'who will punish with words' but here as a substitute for 'who will say and speak.'")

12.141–42:   οἱ δ' ἦ τοι εἷος μὲν εὐκνήμιδας Ἀχαιοὺς
              ὄρνυον . . .
—ἀντὶ τοῦ τέως νῦν κεῖται, οἷον μέχρι τινός. διόπερ οὐχ ὑποστικτέον, ἐπεὶ μὴ κυρίως κεῖται.

("For a while—*literally*, until—they were stirring up the well-greaved Achaeans.—*heios* occurs here as a substitute for *teôs*, in the sense of 'up to a certain point.'   Consequently, its clause should not be set off with commas, since *heios* is not used in its proper sense.")

In none of these instances is there a meaningful point of comparison between that which is properly designated by the word in question and that which Homer actually designates with it: there is no question of metaphorical usage.   Nor may these deviations be considered examples of catachresis in the sense in which that term is chiefly used in the scholia, for in each instance the proper word was a common element in Homer's vocabulary.   Thus whatever one thinks of the accuracy of

their interpretation,[7] it is clear that these glosses allege the existence of a third, distinct species of deviation from proper usage. The author is thought arbitrarily to have substituted one word for another of related but different meaning.

Scholiasts' Treatment of Prepositions

In antiquity, prepositions like other words were thought to have proper meanings or uses. There are, however, no extant glosses in the *Iliad* scholia that remark on the *kurion* use of a preposition. This is understandable. Prepositions are so commonplace that any reader might be expected to recognize their proper meanings when they occur. Glosses noting them would be few to begin with and particularly susceptible to omission by copyists.

In order to discover what was comprehended by the ancient view of the proper use of a preposition, it is necessary to turn to the Homeric lexicon of Apollonius the Sophist. This lexicon, a compilation from Aristarchus' commentaries on Homer,[8] contains treatments of ten prepositions: *ana, anti, apo, eis, ex, epi, kata, meta, peri,* and *hupo*. These presentations, which contain an average of three citations apiece, are scarcely comprehensive. Still, in five instances, i.e., *ana, anti, ex, epi, hupo*, one usage exemplified from Homer is identified as the *kurion* usage. Except in the case of *anti*, whose spatial use as a preposition is unexampled in Homer and very rare elsewhere, the *kurion* usage corresponds closely to what modern philology identifies as the basic, spatial meaning of the preposition involved. Thus Apollonius exemplifies the *kurion* usage of *ana* with *Iliad* 5.597–99:

> ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἀνὴρ ἀπάλαμνος, ἰὼν πολέος πεδίοιο,
> στήῃ ἐπ' ὠκυρόῳ ποταμῷ ἅλαδε προρέοντι
> ἀφρῷ μορμύροντα ἰδών, ἀνά τ' ἔδραμ' ὀπίσσω.

("as when some poor man, who was passing through a great plain, stopped at the edge of a rapid river flowing seaward and, once he had seen how it roared with foam, ran back up.")

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[7] *enipsei* in 7.447 is usually taken as a future form of *enepein* rather than *eniptein* (cf. *LSJ* s.v. *enepō*). Thus the attached gloss may be incorrect or otiose. Still, it serves to illustrate the notion of substitution, which is the only reason for adducing it. The other glosses do not seem at all controversial except, of course, in their employment of explanation by substitution.

[8] Cf. L. Cohn, "Apollonius," *RE* 2.1, Coll. 135–36.

Here there is some ambiguity as to whether *ana* is intended to exemplify what is now supposed to be its basic meaning, "up," since the man pictured would likely be running up the river's bank, or whether it is supposed merely to reinforce *opissô* in its frequent meaning, "back." On either interpretation, Apollonius' idea of *ana's kurion* usage is close to the modern idea of its basic spatial meaning.

Apollonius illustrates the *kurion* of *ex* with a phrase from *Iliad* 7.422–23:

> (ἠέλιος) ἐξ ἀκαλαρρείταο βαθυρρόου Ὠκεανοῖο
> οὐρανὸν εἰσανιών.

("The sun climbing up into heaven out of soft, deep Ocean.")

This use of *ex* clearly corresponds to its basic, spatial meaning, "out of." The *kurion* use of *epi* is illustrated with *Odyssey* 13.102: αὐτὰρ ἐπὶ κρατὸς λιμένος τανυφύλλος ἐλαίη. ("Then upon the head of the harbor is a leafy olive tree.") If the "head of the harbor" is a piece of land, e.g., that in the innermost recess of the harbor, then *epi* is used in its basic, spatial meaning to denote position upon a surface. Finally, the *kurion* use of *hupo* is illustrated with *Iliad* 11.635, where Nestor's cup is described: δύω δ' ὑπὸ πυθμένες ἦσαν. ("There were two supports beneath"—sc. each of four handles.) This use corresponds exactly to the basic, spatial meaning of *hupo*, "beneath" or "under."

Apollonius describes uses of prepositions in three ways other than *kurion*. Most frequently (twenty times), he notes that in addition to its *kurion* use the preposition in question is also used *anti* some other preposition. On three occasions, he himself substitutes *epi* for *anti*: one preposition is said to be used "in the place of" another. Finally, he characterizes uses of a preposition as familiar or customary for him and his readers, *sunêthes hêmin*, four times, s.v. *eis*, *kata*, *meta*, and *peri*.

It appears, then, that the chief contrast to the *kurion* use of a preposition was its use *anti*, as a substitute for or equivalent of some other preposition. Apollonius' use of the expression, *sunêthes hêmin*, however, raises some doubt about the proper interpretation of *anti*, at least, insofar as it is used of prepositional usage. It is possible to suppose on the basis of his text that when Apollonius describes one Homeric use of a preposition as being *anti* another preposition, the intended contrast

is with the *sunêthes* use of the preposition.   On this interpretation, the
general sense of a typical entry in Apollonius would be, "Homer some-
times uses this preposition in its proper way or, at least, in the way that
is familiar to us; he also uses it in a way that is equivalent to (*anti*) our
use of this other preposition."

In fact, it is well established that the idea behind Aristarchus' *anti*
glosses—and, presumably, Apollonius' as well—is that Homer sub-
stituted one preposition for another within his own dialect and not that
he expressed with one preposition that which Aristarchus and his con-
temporaries expressed with another.   Still, this second interpretation
of the *anti* glosses will probably seem inviting to readers who have not
investigated the matter for themselves.   Consequently, it will be ad-
vantageous to present the evidence for the first interpretation, even
though that will require a long parenthesis.

Only a few previous scholars have dealt with Aristarchus' *anti* glosses
to prepositions.   They have all interpreted them as suggesting that
Homer sometimes used one preposition when he meant another, even
though none of these scholars thought that the idea had any merit.
Thus Lehrs, *Quaestiones Epicae* (1837) 89, will not admit that Aristarchus
himself formally recognized a general license to interchange preposi-
tions.   He nevertheless concedes that Aristarchus often wrote as if such
a license existed and in so doing led his successors into the belief that
it did:

> dubius . . . an ipse (Aristarchus) iam tanquam legem agnoverit licere vel
> poetae certe licere commutare praepositiones.   Non dubito quin observa-
> tioni soli nimium intentus nec ad penetralia tortuosarum significationum
> perveniens et ipse facile labi potuerit et sectatoribus multo magis peccandi
> ansam dare.

In 1853, Friedländer published as a preface to his edition of the
fragments of Aristarchus in the *Iliad* scholia a collection of the glosses
from these scholia that seemed to derive from Aristarchus and that
explained prepositions or grammatical structures as substitutes for other
expressions.   Although he does not dwell on theoretical matters,
Friedländer's scattered remarks make it clear that he views such glosses
as equations within the Homeric dialect rather than translations from
Homeric speech into Aristarchus' *koine*, e.g., p. 18:

sicut Aristarchus prisci sermonis fluctione induci se passus est ut Homerum verborum tempora modosque confundere existimaret; ita etiam nominum casus liberrime ab eo permutatos esse censuit.

With respect to *anti* glosses on prepositions, Friedländer merely quotes Lehrs' judgment, which has been cited more fully above. Cohn in his 1895 article on Aristarchus (*RE* 2.1, col. 871) is more affirmative than Lehrs in imputing the idea of substitution to Aristarchus: "(Aristarch) glaubte ... dass die Präpositionen willkürlich mit einander vertauscht werden können."

Examination of a few of the *anti* glosses to prepositions in the *Iliad* will show that this characterization of Aristarchus' approach is the only possible one. A good gloss to begin with is to *Iliad* 1.423–24. It is important because it explicitly attaches Aristarchus' name to examination by substitution. The Homeric lines with the gloss read:

> Ζεὺς γὰρ ἐς Ὠκεανὸν μετ' ἀμύμονας Αἰθιοπῆας
> χθιζὸς ἔβη κατὰ δαῖτα

—λέξεις Ἀριστάρχου ἐκ τοῦ ᾱ τῆς Ἰλιάδος ὑπομνήματος, τὸ μὲν μετ' ἀμύμονας ἐπ' ἀμύμονας, ὅ ἐστι πρὸς ἀμώμους, ἀγαθούς. τὸ δὲ κατὰ δαῖτα ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπὶ δαῖτα. οὕτως γὰρ νῦν Ὅμηρος τέθεικεν. ἔνιοι δὲ ποιοῦσι μετὰ δαῖτα, ὅπως ᾖ αὐτοῖς αὐτόθεν τὸ μετά ἐπί. χρῶνται δὲ καὶ πλείονες ἄλλοι τῶν ποιητῶν τῇ κατά ἀντὶ τῆς ἐπί. Σοφοκλῆς, ἐγὼ κατ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὁρᾷς ἐξέρχομαι. οὕτως δὲ εὕρομεν καὶ ἐν τῇ Μασσαλιωτικῇ καὶ Σινωπικῇ καὶ Κυπρίᾳ καὶ Ἀντιμαχείῳ καὶ Ἀριστοφανείῳ.

("For yesterday Zeus went to Oceanus after the faultless Ethiopians towards dinner ... —Words of Aristarchus from the first book of his commentary on the *Iliad*:"*After the fautles* means to the fautles, i.e., in the direction of the faultless, the worthy. *Towards dinner* is a substitute for *to dinner*, for in such a way has Homer phrased it here. Some editors alter the text to *after dinner*, so that they might have another instance of *after* meaning *to* in the same passage. A good number of other poets, however, use *towards* for *to*, e.g., Sophocles: 'I am setting forth, as you see, towards him.' We have found the text thus in manuscripts from Marseilles, Sinope, and Cyprus and in the editions of Antimachus and Aristophanes.")

Here it seems almost certain that Aristarchus means to equate *meta* with *epi* within Homer's dialect because he retains Homer's archaic

orthography, *amumonas*. The words that follow represent his transla-
tion of Homer's phrase into the *koinê: pros amômous, agathous*. Similar-
ly, Homeric usage, with which Aristarchus was thoroughly familiar,
strongly suggests that *kata anti tou epi* means that Homer uses *kata* as a
substitute for his normal expression, given the context, *epi*. *Epi daita*
would, in fact, represent Homer's normal way of expressing what he
expresses here with *kata daita*. Verbs of motion are complemented
with *epi deipnon* or *dorpon* in *Iliad* 2.381 and 19.275 and in *Odyssey*
2.127, 8.395, 12.439, 18.288, and 24.394. There is no phrase analogous
to *kata daita* in the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey*.

Two other presumably Aristarchian glosses show that this inter-
pretation of *anti* is sometimes unavoidable. *Iliad* 13.492–93 with its
gloss reads:

> λαοὶ ἕπονθ', ὡς εἴ τε μετὰ κτίλον ἕσπετο μῆλα
> πιόμεν' ἐκ βοτάνης
> —ἡ διπλῆ, ὅτι ἐκ βοτάνης ἐστὶ μετὰ τὴν βόσκησιν, ὡς λέγομεν ἐξ
> ἀρίστου παρέσομαι ἀντὶ τοῦ μετα τὸ ἄριστον.

("Masses followed as if sheep were following after a ram from grazing to
drink ... —The line is daggered with the note that *from grazing* is *after
feeding*, as we say *I will come from lunch* instead of *after lunch*.")

Here the parallel with contemporary usage shows that the equivalence
of *ek* and *meta* is alleged within Homer's language. The argument is:
in Homer's phrase, *ek* is used for Homer's *meta* just as, in our phrase,
we use *ek* instead of our normal *meta*. If the idea were that Homer's
ek equaled the contemporary *meta*, Aristarchus would have adduced a
phrase from contemporary usage that was analogous to Homer's but
used *meta* instead of *ek*.

Iliad 22.153 with its gloss reads:

> ἔνθα δ' ἐπ' αὐτάων πλυνοὶ εὐρέες ἔασι.
> —ὅτι πρόθεσις ἤλλακται καὶ πτῶσις ἀντὶ τοῦ παρ' αὐταῖς.

("There are washing places nearby upon these, sc. fountains.—The prep-
osition has been altered and the case also, instead of *by these*.")

Here the assertion that the preposition has been altered cannot suggest
that a contemporary speaker would use a different one. It apparently
means that Homer, though normally using *para* and the dative to desig-

nate proximity (a fact that may be readily confirmed with any Homeric lexicon), in this line altered *para* plus the dative to *epi* with the genitive. It might be noted that such an alteration is metrically necessary, given the rest of the line.

The gloss to 22.153 is also interesting because it raises the possibility that other *anti* glosses may at an earlier stage of their transmission have also contained the explanation that the preposition had been "altered." Later copyists may have reduced such scholia to their essential point, i.e., the *anti* phrase alone. Though this is only hypothetical as far as glosses on prepositions are concerned, it is demonstrable that some *anti* glosses on grammatical points underwent this sort of shortening. Thus *Iliad* 1.163–64 with its gloss reads in Venetian A:

> οὐ μὲν σοί ποτε ἶσον ἔχω γέρας, ὅππoτ' Ἀχαιοὶ
> Τρώων ἐκπέρσωσ' εὖ ναιόμενον πτολίεθρον.
> —ὅτι Ζηνόδοτος γράθει οὐδ' ὅτ' Ἀχαιοί. ἠγνόηκε δὲ ὅτι ἤλλακται τὸ ἔχω ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔσχον.

("I never have a prize equal to you whenever the Achaians sacked a well-appointed city of the Trojans.—Zenodotus writes *not even when the Achaeans* ... He did not realize that *I have* has been substituted for *I had*.")

The later manuscripts, BLV, have simply the gloss, *anti tou eschon*, without further explanation. The same omission of the explanation that the author "has altered" a word may be seen in the comparison of the early and late versions of the gloss to 13.343.

It should be noted that some scholia confuse variations within the author's own dialect within differences between the author's dialect and the *koinê*. In the gloss to 13.492–93, for example, the scholiast's equation of *ek* and *meta* is, as the sequel shows, intended to apply within Homer's dialect. His paraphrase of *botanês* as *boskêsin*, however, involves translating Homer's word into its modern equivalent. The scholiast does not separate these two different kinds of explanation. One paraphrase serves to convey both ideas. In the gloss to 1.243–44, however, which is said to be a verbatim quotation from Aristarchus, the two kinds of explanation are separated. Aristarchus first equates *meta amumonas* with *epi amumonas*. This equation holds within Homer's language. He then gives a loose, modernized paraphrase, *pros amômous, agathous*. This it seems possible that confusion between these two types

of explanation results from the same sort of shortening that has led to
the loss of *êllaktai* from some *anti* glosses. Aristarchus may always
have separated the two types of explanation while later copyists may
have in some instances transmitted only the final paraphrase.

Summary and Criticism of the Ancient Approach

In this section, we have seen that the ancient approach to prepositions
possessed a concept equivalent to the modern idea of a preposition's
basic, spatial meaning, i.e., the *kurion* use of a preposition. Those uses
of a preposition that modern philology describes as metaphorical or
transferred were described by ancient grammarians as substitutions of
one preposition for another. This idea was not the same as explanation
by metaphor or catachresis. Rather the author was thought arbitrarily
to have used a different preposition from the one that conveyed his
meaning precisely and to have expected his readers to be able to perceive
which other preposition was really intended.

The fundamental flaw of the ancient approach is obvious: it does not
capture secondary meanings or nuances. For example, Aristarchus'
explanation of his own expression, *ex aristou*, as an equivalent to *meta
ariston* neglects the concrete picture of egression that underlies the first
phrase. If we may assume that modern methods are essentially sound,
ex aristou paresomai implies that the speaker will appear having come
more or less directly from his own lunch. *Meta ariston presomai* sug-
gests only that the speaker will appear at some indeterminate time after
someone's lunch or after lunch-time in general. Presumably, Aris-
tarchus was aware of these differences in nuance. His approach, how-
ever, did not provide him with the tools to analyze the differences.

A more subtle flaw in the ancient approach is that it does not syste-
matically distinguish between abstract and concrete uses of preposi-
tions, even though it implicitly recognizes the difference. We have
seen that Apollonius regularly chose phrases of spatial meaning to illus-
trate the *kurion* use of prepositions. This practice implicitly confirms
the modern feeling that concrete uses occupy a primary place in speak-
ers' minds. The primacy of concrete uses is lost sight of, however, in
the explanation by substitution of abstract uses. For example, Apol-
lonius' entry under *ex* reads:

κυρίως ἡ πρόθεσις, ἐξ ἀκαλαρρείταο βαθυρρόου Ὠκεανοῖο. ἀντὶ τῆς
ἀπό, ἐξ ἵππων ἆλτο χαμᾶζε. ἀντὶ δὲ τῆς ὑπέρ, Ἥρη, τίπτε σὸς υἱὸς
ἐμὸν ῥόον ἔχραε κήδειν ἐξ ἄλλων. ἀντὶ τοῦ ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἄλλους.

("The preposition is used in its proper sense: 'out of soft, deep Ocean';
as a substitute for *off*: 'He jumped out of his horses to the ground'; and as
a substitute for *above*: 'Hera, why did your son want to bother my stream
out of others?' As a substitute for *above the others*.")

The first citation, *kuriôs*, implicitly recognizes the primacy of con-
crete uses. The relationship between concrete and abstract uses is not
an issue in the second citation, *anti tês apo*, since it involves only spatial
ideas. In the third citation, the inference is inescapable that *huper allous*
represents the *kurion* use of *huper*. *Huper*, however, conveys an ab-
stract notion in this phrase. Thus the primacy of spatial notions,
though often implicit in the ancient approach, is lost sight of in the
explanation of abstract phrases.

Despite these two flaws and their somewhat paradoxical nature, the
explanations of the ancient approach are not necessarily incorrect in
every instance. If one examines his own linguistic habits, he will, I
believe, acknowledge that sometimes, when he uses a word, he has lost
sight of its proper meaning and conceives of it rather as an equivalent
of some other word of related meaning. English dictionaries advise
us, for example, that *liable* is sometimes used to mean no more than
likely—although that is not yet an "accepted" usage; *to secure* is some-
times used to mean no more than *to acquire*; *absolutely*, no more than
completely; *since*, no more than *because*.

The phenomenon of word substitution is intelligible when we recall
that people infer the proper way to use their language from hearing it
and reading it, and also that utterances typically have more significant
features than are necessary for essentially correct interpretation. The
notion that a speaker has of a word's meaning, then, in part derives from
situations in which he inferred its meaning from an otherwise intel-
ligible context. If that is the case, it is not difficult to understand how
a sentence in which (say) *liable* is used in its proper sense, e.g., "The
driver is liable to be sued," might lead to the inference that "liable" is
sometimes just another way of saying "likely" and to the creation of
sentences like, "It is liable to rain." In general, when the denotations
of two expressions with only slightly different connotations frequently

converge, it seems inevitable that some people will infer that the less familiar expression is sometimes used merely as a substitute for the more familiar one. That inference, however unjustified in the first instance, will in turn lead those people to use the less familiar expression themselves as a substitute for the more familiar one for the sake of variety, perhaps, or the appearance of erudition. If that happens frequently enough, the less familiar expression will in fact acquire as a secondary meaning the role of substitute for the more familiar expression. At that point, there is no apparent reason why even the most careful author should avoid using the less familiar expression as a substitute. Careful authors might find such substitution useful for the sake of variety or for avoiding the appearance of pedantry.

There will be more to say concerning the theory of substitution in the sequel. For the present, it does not seem correct to assume with Lehrs that all glosses that are based on the notion of substitution are necessarily incorrect. The shortcoming of the ancient approach lies in its attempt to explain all deviations from proper meaning as substitutions. The modern approach has shown that most such deviations are concealed metaphors. This does not, however, exclude the possibility that there is a residue of passages to which the ancient approach may be correctly applied.

3. APPLICATION OF THE ANCIENT APPROACH

Thucydides 8.79.5–6

My study of Thucydides' use of prepositions led me, before I was familiar with the ancient approach, to conclude that there were a number of prepositional phrases for which the modern approach was misleading. A clear example of that involves Thucydides' use of *es* with the accusative and *epi* with the genitive to designate ingression with verbs of motion. *Es*, "into," occurs far more frequently in such contexts than does *epi*. According to the modern approach, the use of *epi* is conditioned by two factors. First, the proper use of *epi* is to designate superimposition; it means "upon." This meaning is sometimes applied by a species of transference to horizontal relationships: position upon becomes juxtaposition. Second, the genitive in such phrases

represents the genitive of goal, which is seen frequently in Homer, e.g., *Iliad* 5.849–850:

> ὁ βῆ ῥ' ἰθὺς Διομήδεος ἱπποδάμοιο.
> οἱ δ' ὅτε δὴ σχεδὸν ἦσαν ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισιν ἰόντες

("He went straight for the equestrian Diomedes. And when they were close to each other.")

It results from these two factors that *epi* with the genitive properly designates motion in the general direction of but not necessarily into a relatively distant goal.

There are numerous instances where Thucydides uses *epi* and the genitive in this, its proper sense. Perhaps the clearest example occurs in 1.137.2:

> ὁλκάδος τυχὼν ἀναγομένης ἐπ' Ἰωνίας καὶ ἐπιβὰς καταφέρεται χειμῶνι ἐς τὸ Ἀθηναίων στρατόπεδον, ὃ ἐπολιόρκει Νάξον.

("Having come across a freighter that was setting out in the direction of Ionia, he boards it and is carried by a storm into the midst of the Athenian force that was besieging Naxos.")

Thucydides normally complements *anagesthai* with *es*; cf. 6.98.3; 8.10.2; 8.33.3. *Anagesthai epi* plus the genitive occurs only here. Thus it is a departure from normal usage. It was clearly prompted by the desire to capture the particular nuance of *epi* with the genitive on the basis of its proper meaning. Similar uses of *epi* with the genitive occur in 2.83.3; 3.102.5; 7.1.2; 8.19.3 and 32.1.

In 8.79.5–6, however, no amount of analysis reveals similar motivation for analogous departures from normal usage:

> οἱ μὲν οὕτως ἐπὶ τῆς Σάμου ἀνεχώρησαν, οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι κατα-
> πλεύσαντες ἐπὶ τῆς Μυκάλης ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο . . . τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ
> μελλόντων αὐτῶν ἐπιπλεῖν τῇ Σάμῳ ἀγγέλλεται Στρομβιχίδης . . .
> ἀφιγμένος, καὶ εὐθὺς ἀπέπλεον πάλιν ἐπὶ τῆς Μιλήτου, οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι
> . . . ἐπίπλουν αὐτοὶ ποιοῦνται τῇ Μιλήτῳ . . . καὶ ὡς οὐδεὶς αὐτοῖς
> ἀντανήγετο ἀπέπλευσαν πάλιν ἐς τὴν Σάμον.

("Thus the Athenians returned to Samos, while the Peloponnesians, having sailed down to Mykale, pitched camp. . . . The next day, when the Peloponnesians were about to make an approach against Samos, the arrival of Strombichides is announced, and the Peloponnesians were immediately

PROPER USE OF "EPI" WITH GENITIVE CONTRASTED WITH "ES"

A. *Abstractly*

B. *In 1.137.2*

FIGURE I

sailing back again to Miletus. The Athenians themselves make an ap-
proach against Miletus. . . . And since no one came out against them, they
sailed back again to Samos.")

The first *epi, epi tes Samou anechôrêsan*, is not a departure from normal
usage. Thucydides complements *anachôrein* with *epi* plus the genitive
seventeen times and never complements it with *es*. Thus *anachôrein
epi* (genitive) is an idiomatic formula like *ep' oikou*, "homeward,"
which occurs over fifty times to the exclusion of *es oikon*. Modern
philology, of course, recognizes that such stereotyped phrases often
occur in contexts where the force of their underlying metaphors is lost
sight of. Thus Thucydides' first use of *epi* in this passage is not a good
example of phrases for which the modern approach is misleading.

On the other hand, *katapleusantes epi tês Mukalês* does represent a departure from normal usage. Thucydides complements *kataplein* with *es* fifteen times, while 8.79.5 is the only instance where *kataplein* is complemented with *epi* and the genitive. The case is similar with *apepleon palin epi tês Milêtou.* Thucydides complements *apoplein* with *es* twenty-seven times; with *epi* and the genitive, ten times. An almost exactly parallel phrase with *es* occurs in 8.63.2: ἀπέπλευσαν πάλιν ἐς τὴν Μίλητον.

In these two phrases, I have not been able to discover any reason for Thucydides' use of *epi* plus the genitive instead of the more frequent *es*. One possibility is suggested by the parallel phrase from 8.63.2, i.e., that the tense of the verb is the significant variable. Thucydides used *epi* with the genitive to complement the imperfect *apepleon*, which views the motion as incomplete, but *es* for the aorist, *apepleusan*. This explanation, however, is not supported by Thucydidean usage elsewhere; for Thucydides complements imperfect forms of *apoplein* with *es* in 2.84.4, 6.50.1 and 61.6, while he complements aorist forms with *epi* and with *epi* and genitive in 2.66.2; 4.45.2; 5.11.3; 8.19.3 and 27.6.

Thus a comparison of 8.79.5–6 with 1.137.2, in my opinion, compels the conclusion that Thucydides used prepositions in two different ways. Sometimes, as in 1.137.2, he was attentive to the proper meaning of each preposition and departed from normal usage only to capture special nuances dependent on concealed metaphors. In such instances, the applicability of the modern approach is quite clear. Sometimes, as in 8.79.5–6, his departures from normal usage are difficult to explain in terms of the modern approach. In these instances, it seems better to use the ancient approach than to devise a tenuous metaphorical explanation. Thus in 8.79.5–6, it seems best to conclude that Thucydides simply used *epi* as a substitute for *es*.

At this point, it has become possible to show more precisely how the ancient approach may be used to supplement the modern one. It must be conceded in the first place that the modern approach is not greatly embarrassed by such data as Thucydides' use of *epi* with the genitive to designate, like *es*, ingression in general. This use of *epi* is mentioned, for example, by Schwyzer (2.470) without comment. The theory seems to be that after repeated, metaphorical use a preposition is sometimes used in a general sense or even slightly inaccurately.

Thus rather than remembering that *epi* designated one particular sort
of ingression, Thucydides in composing 8.79.5–6 is supposed, in effect,
to have thought, "*Epi* designates ... ah well some sort of ingression;
it will do." The ancient approach, on the other hand, implies that
such usage arose rather from overlapping in the functions of the two
different words. Thus for a passage like 8.79.5–6, the ancient approach
would have Thucydides thinking, "I have heard *epi* with the genitive
used to mean the same as *es* with the accusative; here I will take ad-
vantage of the same license and use *epi* to mean *es* for the sake of variety,
in order to give this passage a distinctive tone."

There is no direct way to determine which sort of thinking chiefly
influenced Thucydides' choice of prepositions. It seems to me, how-
ever, that the assumption of the second sort, which involves the idea of
substitution, offers two great advantages. First, it allows us to draw
a definite line between what clearly is a concealed metaphor (e.g., the
use of *epi* in 1.137.2) and what is not (e.g., the use of *epi* in 8.79.5–6).
In the absence of the supplementary substitution hypothesis, the asser-
tion that a particular usage conceals a metaphor is lessened in signific-


FIGURE 2

ance by the realization that virtually any conceivable use of the same word would be similarly explained.

Second, without such a supplement, the modern approach leaves the implication that the author's intended meaning is always as close to the preposition's basic, spatial meaning as the context will logically permit. This is because the preposition's basic meaning is, as it were, the only center of gravity that attracts the meaning of the preposition. The ancient approach, on the other hand, implies that the frequent inter- changeableness of prepositions creates a second center of gravity, a center which, if its influence predominates, attracts the preposition rather towards the basic meaning of its occasional synonym. In this respect, the ancient approach does one thing that the modern approach fails to do: it gives formal recognition to the intentionally casual use of language.

Thucydides 2.90.1

An example of how the ancient approach can this way assist inter- pretation is provided by a controversial passage in Thucydides, 2.90.1, which with its gloss reads:

> οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ ἐπέπλεον ἐς τὸν κόλπον καὶ τὰ στενά, βουλόμενοι ἄκοντας ἔσω προαγαγεῖν αὐτούς, ἀναγαγόμενοι ἅμα ἔῳ ἔπλεον, ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ταξάμενοι τὰς ναῦς ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν, ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου, δεξιῷ κέρᾳ ἡγουμένῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ ὥρμουν.—ἐπὶ τήν, ἀντὶ τοῦ παρὰ τήν.

> ("When the Athenians did not sail against them into the bay and the nar- rows, the Peloponnesians, who wished to draw the unwilling Athenians in, lifting off set sail at dawn once they had arranged their ships four deep upon their own coast in towards the bay with the right wing leading, just as they were lying at anchor.—*Upon*, a substitute for *along*.")

In this well-known passage, twenty Athenian ships under the com- mand of Phormio are moored at Molycrian Rhium. They face seventy-seven Peloponnesian ships moored at Achaean Rhium and directed by a Lacedaemonian commission, which includes Brasidas. In the sequel, Phormio, fearing for Naupactus, to which the Pelopon- nesians seem to be headed, sets sail to protect it. The Peloponnesians

THUCYDIDES 2.90

FIGURE 3

attack the Athenians en route and have nearly won a decisive victory when fortune reverses the course of the battle.

Most interpreters agree in connecting *epi tên heautôn gên* with *epleon* rather than *taxamenoi*. Of these Bloomfield and Grote believe that the Lacedaemonians must have sailed directly for Naupactus and, consequently, they alter the phrase to *epi tên ekeinôn* (sc. *Athênaiôn*) *gên*.[9] On behalf of this interpretation, it should be noted that that would have been the most sensible course for the Peloponnesians to follow under the circumstances that Thucydides describes.

Poppo and Sheppard and Evans raise a curious objection to the

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[9] *V. ad loc. History of Thucydides* trans. Bloomfield (3 vols., London 1829) and Grote, *A History of Greece* (London 1888) 5.137 ff.

Bloomfield–Grote interpretation.[10]   In 2.90.2, the Peloponnesians are
said to have prepared to intercept the Athenians if Phormio should set
sail in the belief (*nomisas*) that the enemy was sailing for Naupactus (*epi
tên Naupakton*).   According to Sheppard, "if they had been heading for
Naupactus, it would have been a case of seeing not believing."   This
objection is not valid, since *epi tên Naupakton*, like "for Naupactus,"
may express the intended destination of the Peloponnesians, which
would be a question of belief rather than observation no matter how
close the Peloponnesians came to Naupactus.   It is not clear even in
Thucydides' account that it was actually the Peloponnesians' intention,
given the opportunity, to attack Naupactus.   Sheppard's objection
would be valid if *epi tên Naupakton* meant only "in the direction of
Naupactus" without any implication about intended destination.   If
this were the case, it would be odd of Thucydides to speak of the *belief*
that the Peloponnesians were sailing in that direction in which they
were observed to be sailing.   It would be even more anomalous, how-
ever, to speak of the belief that they were sailing in a direction in which
they were observed not to be sailing—which is the situation that Shep-
pard's remarks imply.

It appears that the only weighty objection to the Bloomfield-Grote
interpretation is that, as Jowett emphasizes in rejecting it, it necessitates
changing the text without any manuscript authority.

Goeller, Arnold, and Sheppard and Evans believe that the phrase
indicates that the Peloponnesians sailed east towards Drepanum.[11]   The
tactical plausibility of this course will be discussed below.   Poppo ob-
jected to this view that the interpretation of *epi tên heautôn gên* as *in suum
agrum*, i.e., Drepanum was inept, "Peloponnesiis iam tum in suo agro
versantibus."   Arnold's solution to that was to suggest that the refer-
ence was to homelands in a proper sense, i.e., Sicyon, Corinth, and
Pellene "to which places the greater number of the ships belonged."
He added that *epi* with the accusative in this instance also suggested
the idea of *epi* with the dative, "near their own coast."   Arnold did
not, however, argue in detail on behalf of either of these somewhat

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   [10] *V. ad loc. De Bello Peloponnesiaco* ed. Poppo (11 vols., Leipzig 1821-40), and Sheppard
and Evans, *Notes on Thucydides: Books i, ii, and iii* (London 1873).
   [11] *V. ad loc. Thucydides* ed., trans. Goeller (Leipzig 1836), *The History of the Pelopon-
nesian War* ed. Arnold (8th edition), (Oxford 1874) and Sheppard and Evans *op. cit.*

heterodox suggestions.   Neither one has found any favor with subse-
quent commentators.   It would seem that Poppo's objection to the
interpretation of Goeller et al. must be allowed to stand.

Jowett and Gomme arrive at the same picture of Peloponnesian
maneuvers as Goeller et al., but do so by altering the prepositional
phrase to *para tên heautôn gên*.[12]   This alteration, *para* for *epi*, is sup-
ported by manuscripts C and G.   In addition, the occurrence of *epi*
four times in the immediate context may have caused the copyist's
error.   (On the other hand, of course, it is also possible that the reading
in C and G arose from interpolation of the gloss, *anti tou para*, which is
preserved in ABFGM and has been restored to C by a later hand.)
The emendation based on C and G does not cause any linguistic diffi-
culties.   Thus, in general the Jowett-Gomme interpretation is attrac-
tive.

Still, there is stronger manuscript authority for *epi*, which occurs in
ABEF and M.   Moreover, two obscurities remain in Thucydides'
account.   The first is common to all interpretations that associate *epi
tên heautôn gên* with *epleon* rather than *taxamenoi*.   The implication of
this association is that the phrase, *epi tessarôn taxamenoi*, stands alone
without further modification.   The meaning of this use of *epi* with the
genitive may be readily ascertained from parallel uses in Thucydides.
The usage occurs six other times with different numerical designations:
4.94.1; 5.68.3; 6.67.1 (*bis*) and 67.2; 7.79.1.   In each instance, the
numerical designation refers to the number of horizontal rows extend-
ing from wing to wing in an infantry formation, as opposed to the
number of vertical columns extending from the front of the formation
to the back.   Thus *epi tessarôn taxamenoi* should mean "four deep."
It is, however, universally agreed that the Peloponnesian maneuvers
only make sense on the assumption that they set sail four abreast and,
therefore, approximately twenty deep. Only when they turned to
attack the Athenians did their line assume the proportions four deep
and twenty abreast.   Commentators supply the phrase *epi mias*, "single
file," as an analogous use of *epi* with the genitive.   This phrase does
not, however, occur in Thucydides, who uses *epi kerôs*, "towards the
wing," for sailing single file: 2.90.4; 6.32.2; 6.50.4; 8.104.1.   What

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[12] *V. ad loc. Thucydides* trans. Jowett (2 vols., Oxford 1831) and Gomme, *A Historical
Commentary on Thucydides* (3 vols., Oxford 1945–56).

the expression, *epi mias*, shows is that *epi* with the genitive is not quite as unambiguous as the phrase, "so many deep," in English.   *Epi* with the genitive can mean, "so many abreast," but only where there is some clear indication that it bears that meaning rather than its normal meaning.   Its use in association with the number one constitutes such an indication, since by convention it regularly bears its less frequent meaning in such contexts.   Since in the passage under discussion the number involved is four rather than one, Thucydides would have had to expect his readers to impute the more frequent meaning, "so many deep," to *epi*, unless he provided some other indication that the less frequent meaning was intended.   An analogous situation occurs in Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 2.4.2:

ἐγένοντο τὸ μέτωπον ἐπὶ τριακοσίων, . . . τὸ δὲ βάθος ἐφ᾽ ἑκατόν.

("They aligned themselves, 300 along the front of the formation, . . . a hundred in depth.")

Here *to men metópon* and *to de bathos* make it clear that in its first occurrence *epi* does not bear its usual meaning, "so many deep," but rather refers to numbers abreast.   On the Jowett-Gomme interpretation of 2.90.1, however, there is no similar indication to clarify the meaning of *epi tessarôn*.

The second obscurity has to do with tactics.   The Lacedaemonians want to draw the Athenians into the bay east of Rhium to do battle. They are to accomplish this by making a feint at Naupactus.   Their purpose would be defeated if the Athenians simply sailed into Naupactus before the Lacedaemonians intercepted them.   In fact, the Lacedaemonians make the special provision of adding their twenty fastest ships to the head of their line to insure that no Athenian ships actually reach Naupactus (2.90.2).   This being the case, there is no apparent reason why the Lacedaemonians should sail along their own coast to Drepanum rather than taking the quickest route, a straight line, to Naupactus.   Gomme makes a concession to this point in allowing that Thucydides may have underestimated the distance between Drepanum and Naupactus.   He does not say what inference is to be drawn from this.   Apparently, it means that either Thucydides had his facts wrong, i.e., that the Peloponnesians did not sail to Drepanum first, or that although Thucydides' account is correct, he did not realize how odd it

was of the Peloponnesians to sail first to Drepanum.   Neither view
speaks well of Gomme's interpretation.

In defending his view that the Peloponnesians sailed directly for
Naupactus, Grote argued that in addition to tactical considerations, if
the Peloponnesians first sailed east along their own coast, they had at
some point to turn north, but Thucydides does not mention this crucial
maneuver.   To that argument, Gomme replied that Thucydides twice
refers to the Peloponnesian *epistrophê es tên euruchôrian*.   This he takes
as a reference to their turning north to cross the "open" area of the
Crisaean gulf in order to attack the Athenians along the northern shore.
This interpretation, however, is not compelling.   In the first place,
"turn into the open sea" is a curious way to describe a maneuver that
culminates in the shallows along the opposite shore (2.90.5).   In addi-
tion, elsewhere in his text Thucydides always designates distinct bodies
of water with the term, *euruchôria*, rather than the middle as opposed to
the coast of the same body of water.   Thus *euruchôria* is the open sea
as opposed to the harbor between Sphacteria and Pylos in 4.13.3, the
open sea as opposed to the harbor of Syracuse in 7.37.6, and as opposed
to the Hellespont in 8.102.1.   In the passage under consideration,
Thucydides twice (2.83.2 and 86.5) uses *euruchôria* to designate the open
sea west of Rhium, the gulf of Patrae and beyond, as opposed to the
gulf of Crissa, where the Peloponnesian maneuvers take place.   Thus
the indicated interpretation of *epistrophê es tên euruchôrian* is "turn in
the direction of the open sea," i.e., the gulf of Patrae as opposed to the
original direction, *esô tou kolpou*.   If the Peloponnesians sailed directly
for Naupactus, i.e., northeast, they would have turned west towards
the gulf of Patrae to intercept the Athenians.   (The use of *es* implied,
i.e., to designate motion in the direction of a distant place, is not diffi-
cult to parallel, cf. 3.22.7; 4.3.1.)

The final interpretation is that of Classen.[13]   He recommends con-
necting *epi tên heautôn gên* with *taxamenoi*; "the Lacedaemonians lined
up four deep with the shore behind them."   The merits of this inter-
pretation are clear immediately.   In addition to retaining the best
reading, it eliminates the difficulty with *epi tessarôn*.   Viewed lined up
against the shore, the Peloponnesians were four deep and approximately

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[13] *V. ad loc. Thucydides* ed. Classen (Berlin 1889) ii.

twenty abreast.   When they set out with the right wing leading, these figures would be reversed, four abreast and twenty deep.   Classen's interpretation also circumnavigates the difficulties having to do with Peloponnesian maneuvers.   The question of whether they were hugging their own coast or sailing directly for Naupactus may be resolved independently on the basis of tactical considerations and on the interpretation of *epistrophê es tên euruchôrian*.

The difficulty with Classen's interpretation is that pointed out by Jowett: "*epi* in such a connection would mean that the ships had their prows turned towards the coast, not from it."   This remark, of course, reflects the modern approach to prepositions.   The proper sense of *epi* with the accusative is motion up and onto an elevation.   Even when it is used, as here, to describe a static, horizontal relationship, the nuance remains that the thing complemented by the phrase tends to move towards or against the accusative object of the phrase.

Classen's interpretation, however, may be redeemed despite Jowett's objection with the help of the ancient approach.   We have seen that the scholiast to this passage glosses the preposition in *epi tên heautôn gên* as a substitute for *para*.   This has long been interpreted as meaning that the ships sailed along (*epi* for *para*) their own coast.   Modern commentators have all rejected the idea that *epleon epi* could mean the same thing as *epleon para* and rightfully so.   In my opinion, however, the gloss presupposes the connection of the *epi* phrase with *taxamenoi* and is on this interpretation, quite defensible.

The evidence that the gloss presupposes this connection is as follows. There are no glosses in the *Iliad*-scholia or elsewhere in Thucydides in which *epi* plus the accusative complementing what is unambiguously a verb of motion, like *epleon*, is interpreted as a substitute for *para*.   There are, however, five glosses in the *Iliad*-scholia and one in those to Thucydides in which *epi* designating position at rest near an object is said to be a substitute for *para*: to *Iliad* 22.153 (see above p. 370), 6.15; 6.26; 7.86; 22.97; and to Thucydides 3.99.1.

It must be conceded that each of these glosses involves the use of *epi* with the genitive or dative as a substitute for *para* with the dative, whereas in the present instance both prepositions govern that accusative. *Tassein*, however, is an unusual verb.   Like *kathistanai*, the action that it designates combines ideas of motion into a place and action within a

place.   The result is that *tassein* is sometimes treated as a verb of motion
and sometimes as a verb of position without any perceptible difference
in meaning.   Thus Thucydides complements *tassein* with *epi* plus the
dative, as if it were a verb of position, in 2.70.1 and 90.2; 3.13.3; 6.67.1;
and 7.4.6; similarly, with *en* plus the dative in 5.6.5; 6.67.1; 7.78.3 and
8.86.9; and with *pros* plus the dative in 7.70.2.   He complements with
epi plus the accusative in 3.78.1 and 4.9.2, as if it were a verb of motion;
similarly, with *pros* plus the accusative in 3.77.3 (*bis*) and 78.3.   He
complements it with *para* plus the accusative, used elsewhere both with
verbs of position and with verbs of motion, in 4.8.7, 11.1, 35.2, 73.4
and 8.104.1.   Therefore, since *tassein* may be considered a verb of
position and since *epi* is frequently described in the scholia as a sub-
stitute for *para* in phrases describing positions, but not in those describ-
ing motions, it seems likely that the gloss *epi anti tou para* presupposes
the connection of the *epi* phrase with *taxamenoi* rather than with *epleon*,
which cannot be considered a verb of position.

On the assumption, then, that the gloss is based on the association
of the *epi* phrase with *taxamenoi*, it should be noted that there is some
overlapping between the meanings of *epi* and the accusative and para
with the accusative when their phrases modify *tassein*.   This because
an elevation *upon* (*epi*) which troops are arranged may also be viewed
as the axis along which (*para*) they are arranged.   Thus in 4.9.2, De-
mosthenes is described as aligning most of his infantry upon (*epi*) strong
points in Pylos: τοὺς μὲν οὖν πολλοὺς ... ἐπὶ τὰ τετειχισμένα μάλιστα
καὶ ἐχυρὰ τοῦ χωρίου πρὸς τὴν ἤπειρον ἔταξε.   In 4.35.2, Spartan
troops in Sphacteria flee to a fortified part of the island and align them-
selves along (*para*) its entire extent together with guards already there:
διαφυγόντες ἐς τὸ ἔρυμα μετὰ τῶν ταύτῃ φυλάκων ἐτάξαντο παρὰ
πᾶν.   These two phrases show that in connection with *tassein*, the
meanings of *epi* and *para* are not so clearly distinct as they are with
verbs that are unambiguously verbs of motion.   Thucydides also uses
epi with the accusative to denote proximity in a way that is close to his
normal use of *para* in 5.10.1 and 6 and in 6.63.2.

It seems to me that Classen's interpretation, supported by what we
have learned about the ancient approach, is preferable to the other
interpretations.   The Peloponnesian ships are said to have lined up
along (*epi* for *para*) their own shore four deep.   The *epi* phrase provides

the necessary indication of the exact meaning of *epi tessarôn*.   The shore is the horizontal axis in terms of which the phrase is to be understood. The Peloponnesians did not set sail four deep, but rather four abreast with the right wing leading.   As we have seen, the single objection to this interpretation is that *epi* should suggest, at least, potential motion towards the object of the phrase and should, therefore, imply that the Peloponnesian ships were facing their own shore, if it is construed with *taxamenoi*.   This is, however, precisely the point that the glossator responds to.   Thucydides was not using *epi* with attention to its proper meaning but rather as a substitute for a near synonym—given the context—*para*.   It is mistaken to attempt to assimilate the meaning of *epi* in its context to its basic, spatial meaning.

   Even if the reader is willing to stipulate the validity of each of the individual steps in the preceding argument, he may retain some doubt about its conclusion.   The question remains, why Thucydides should have substituted *epi* for *para* in the passage at hand.   He gained nothing in variety thereby, since *epi* occurs two other times in the same sentence. Besides, the passage would be sufficiently complex without indulgence in more or less whimsical word substitutions.   In fact, there is a clear reason for the substitution, if we may assume that Thucydides meant to have the Peloponnesians sailing directly for Drepanum.   Specific- ally, Thucydides' sentence is so constructed that the *epi-para tên* phrase might be interpreted as complementing either *epleon* or *taxamenoi*. Word order favors *taxamenoi*, but that the participle is already modified by *epi tessarôn* favors *epleon*.   Suppose Thucydides initially wrote *para tên*, and intended the phrase as a complement of *taxamenoi*.   In revi- sion, it would likely occur to him that *para tên* might just as easily be associated with *epleon*.   There is nothing immediately anomalous about describing the Peloponnesians as sailing "along their own coast," no basis for the reader to infer that *para tên* must certainly not be under- stood as *epleon's* complement.   Hence Thucydides substitutes *epi* for *para*.   That yields roughly the correct meaning in association with *taxamenoi*.   More important, a typical reader (Thucydides could not foresee Arnold) would not suppose that the Peloponnesians, already anchored on their own coast, were said to be sailing towards (*epi*) their own land.   In other words, the substitution of *epi* for *para* seems designed precisely to prevent the association of the phrase with *epleon*.

Thus considerations of various kinds seem to converge to vindicate Classen's interpretation. More significant, we find in the study of 2.90.1 an instance of the ancient approach's capacity for solving a problem that has defied solution in terms of the modern approach.

Thucydides 6.34.1–2 and 6.59.2

The phrases discussed so far involve the use of prepositions in spatial contexts. In the remaining sections, I will attempt to show (1) that the idea of substitution may also be used to develop a more economical explanation of the origin of an abstract usage and (2) that its use together with the scholia may lead to a more satisfactory interpretation of an abstract phrase than has been hitherto obtained.

That the idea of substitution sometimes provides a more economical explanation of usages of abstract meaning may be illustrated through the study of Thucydides' use of *dia* with the genitive. The basic meaning of *dia* is "in two" or "apart" (Schwyzer 2.449). The primacy of this meaning has been ascertained chiefly through comparative studies. *Dia* is thought to derive from IE *dis**, a by-form of *dwis**, and therefore to be cognate with Greek *dis* and Latin *bis*. This meaning of *dia* is preserved chiefly in compounds, e.g., *dialusis*.

As a preposition, *dia*'s earliest concrete meaning is "through." The transformation of the adverbial idea "in two" or "apart," to the prepositional one "through," is not paralleled in English, but it is intelligible. It is easy to see how according to the principles of the modern approach a sentence like Homer's, *Iliad* 3.357: διὰ μὲν ἀσπίδος ἦλθε φαεινῆς ὄβριμον ἔγχος, ("the powerful spear went through the bright shield") represents a natural development from sentences in *dia* functioned as an independent adverb in the vicinity of an ablative-genitive: "the powerful spear went out of the shield in a separating manner."

Strictly, *dia* with the genitive should always mean "through and out" as it does in the verse above; *dia* with the accusative "through but not out." This distinction, however, is not always observed even in Homer, e.g., *Iliad* 12.398. It is lost sight of completely in classical prose, where *dia* with the accusative is reserved for the designation of abstract, causal relationships.

Most uses of *dia* in classical Greek are equivalent to uses of *through*

in English.   An important similarity between the two prepositions is
that the basic meaning of each involves the idea of separation.   We
have just seen that this is the case with *dia*; *through*, on the other hand,
is cognate with words for perforation, e.g., the archaic noun and verb,
thirl.   Therefore *dia* in Greek and *through* in English generally imply
the occurrence of some motion of change, even when the motion or
change is not explicit in the context.   A sentence from Aeschylus,
Septem 122–23, with its gloss, serves to illustrate this point: διὰ δέ τοι
γενύων ἱππείων κινύρονται φόνον χαλινοί.—συντάσσεται οὕτως, οἱ
διὰ τῶν ἱππείων γενύων δετοὶ καὶ δεδεμένοι χαλινοί.   ("Through
equine jaws bridles wail slaughter.—the phrase is construed thus: bridles,
those that were about to be bound through equine jaws and those that
had already been so bound.")   In other words, the *dia* phrase does not
suggest the position at rest of the bridles but rather implies the action,
whether anticipated or accomplished, of attaching bridles by passing
them through horses' jaws.

The case is the same with figurative uses of *dia*.   Thus with respect
to Homer, *Iliad* 12.104: ὁ δ' ἔπρεπε καὶ διὰ πάντων, Ansems, *Bedeutung
und Gebrauch von* dia *bei Homer*, (Munich 1883) points out that the
implication of *dia* is different from that of *en* or *meta*, which do designate
position at rest, in similar contexts: (p. 24) "Hier wollte vielmehr der
Dichter ausdrucken, dass sich der Held Sarpedon nicht bloss unter der
anderen auszeichnete sondern aus allen hervorragte."

In Thucydides, but not to my knowledge elsewhere in classical litera-
ture, *dia* plus the genitive sometimes modifies *einai* in spatial contexts.
The verb to-be excludes the idea of contemporaneous motion.   Rather,
anticipated motion through is implied.   This is paralleled by English
sentences like, "The house is through the woods," where the idea is
that you will come to the house if you go through the woods.

Thucydides' use of *dia* with *einai* to designate anticipated motion is
generally restricted to phrases whose objects are adjectives of quantity
with *chôriou* understood.   The usage occurs five times in Thucydides:

2.89.9: τά τε παραγγελλόμενα ὀξέως δέχεσθε ἄλλως τε καὶ δι' ὀλίγου τῆς
ἐφορμήσεως οὔσης.

("Accept commands quickly, especially with the opposing line of ships
being only a short distance away—through a small space.")

3.21.3: διὰ δέκα δὲ ἐπάλξεων πύργοι ἦσαν μεγάλοι.

("There were great towers every ten parapets—through ten parapets.")

4.76.5: εἰ κατορθοῖτο ἡ πεῖρα καὶ τὸ Δήλιον τειχισθείη, ῥᾳδίως ἤλπιζον
. . . οὔσης ἑκάστοις διὰ βραχέος ἀποστροφῆς, οὐ μενεῖν κατὰ χώραν τὰ
πράγματα.

("If the attempt should succeed and Delium be fortified, they expected
that with a refuge being nearby—through a short space—for all, affairs—
sc. in Boeotia—would not remain stable.")

6.11.1: τῶν δ' εἰ καὶ κρατήσαιμεν διὰ πολλοῦ γε καὶ πολλῶν ὄντων
χαλεπῶς ἂν ἄρχειν δυναίμεθα.

("If we should prevail over them, we would only with difficulty be able to
rule since they are far away—through a great space—and many in num-
ber.")

7.71.3: δι' ὀλίγου γὰρ οὔσης τῆς θέας καὶ πάντων ἅμα ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ
σκοπούντων.

("with the spectacle being nearby—through a small space—and not every-
one looking in the same direction at the same time.")

Examination of these sentences reveals precisely the meaning of *dia*
plus the genitive when complementing *einai* in a spatial context in
Thucydides. The establishment of this meaning will prove crucial in
our discussion below of the applicability of the modern approach to
particular figurative uses of *dia*. Therefore, even at the risk of be-
laboring the obvious, it will be useful to give a diagrammatic repre-
sentation of *dia*'s meaning in these sentences. If then B is *dia* S from
A's point of view, S is the space that A would have to traverse in order
to get to B. Only the second sentence requires a

somewhat special explanation. Apparently the idea is that if you are
a soldier in one tower, you can get to the next tower by going through
ten parapets.

Dia with the genitive also appears in temporal contexts. Usually,
as its basic meaning suggests, it designates duration through a period of
time, e.g., 1.70.8; δι' ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος μοχθοῦσι ("They labor through
their whole lives."), cf. also 2.4.2, 24.1, 94.3; 5.26.5; 7.80.2; 8.15.1.

This meaning of *dia* also appears in the idiomatic phrase, *dia pantos*, "continually,": 1.38.1, 76.1, 84.1, 85.1; 2.49.6; 3.58.3, 93.2; 4.61.5, 119.3; 5.69.1, 105.2; 7.6.1, 61.2. When it designates duration in time, *dia* suggests the passage of an otherwise static situation through a period of time and so implies motion or change.

In addition, *dia* in temporal contexts sometimes bears the meaning, "after." A clear example of this occurs in 7.39.2:

ὅπως . . . παρὰ τὰς ναῦς ἀριστοποιήσωνται, καὶ δι᾽ ὀλίγου αὖθις καὶ αὐθημερὸν ἀπροσδοκήτοις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιχειρῶσιν.

("in order that . . . they might dine by their ships and after—through—a short time again on the same day attack the unexpecting Athenians.")

Other examples, with their genitive objects given in parentheses, are: 1.138.3 (*elachistês boulês*); 2.42.4 (*elachistou kairou*), 83.5 (*bracheos*); 5.14.1 (*oligou*), 66.2 (*bracheias mellêseôs*); 6.11.4 (*oligou*), 47.1 (*oligou*), 91.3 (*ouk . . . dia makrou*); 7.15.2 (*oligou*).

It should be noted that at first glance either the idea of substitution or the principles of the modern approach might be called upon to explain this usage, i.e., either it represents the use of *dia* with the genitive as a substitute for *meta* with the accusative (as the scholiast to 5.14.1 suggests) or it represents a transference of the meaning that *dia* has when it modifies *einai* in spatial contexts. In fact, all secondary considerations support the latter interpretation. It will be worthwhile to state what these considerations are, for we will soon come to a usage in respect to which considerations of the same sort will point rather to explanation by substitution.

First, it favors applying the modern approach to these phrases that in them *dia* designates exactly the same relationship in a temporal context that it does with *einai* in a spatial context. Events *A* and *B* are separated by a period of time, *S*. *S* is the time that must be passed through to get from *A* to *B*.

Moreover, the objects with which Thucydides has chosen to use *dia* in the temporal meaning of "after" correspond close to the objects of *einai dia* in spatial contexts. In the five occurrences of the latter, the object is *oligou* twice and *bracheos* once. In the ten instances of the former usage, the object is *oligou* five times and *bracheos* once. The

objects of the remaining four phrases are all closely analogous to *oligou*
and *bracheos*. In other words, it seems clear that Thucydides wrote *dia
bracheias mellêseôs*, for example, by analogy with *dia oligou* (sc. *chronou*)
and wrote that by analogy with *einai dia oligou* (sc. *chôriou*). Thus in
this instance the particular words involved in the temporal usage seem
to reflect the usage's origin in a spatial usage and thus to lend credence
to the modern approach.

Finally, it speaks against explanation by substitution (*dia = meta*) in
this instance that there are no other phrases in which the meanings of
meta and *dia*, though used in their proper senses, happen to overlap and
thereby to create the impression that the two words might be inter-
changed.

In a readily intelligible transference of its basic, spatial meaning, *dia*
complementing verbs of motion is found with genitive objects that
represent actions or experiences rather than places or periods of time.
Through is used in an equivalent way in English. Examples of this
usage in Thucydides occur in the following passages:

2.11.2: ἀσφάλεια πολλὴ εἶναι μὴ ἂν ἐλθεῖν τοὺς ἐναντίους ἡμῖν διὰ
μάχης.

("There to be great certainty that the enemy would not do"—go through
—"battle with us.")

3.45.3: διεξεληλύθασί γε διὰ πασῶν τῶν ζημιῶν οἱ ἄνθρωποι.

("People have exhausted the list of"—gone through all—"punishments"—
sc. in attempting to deter crime.)

4.92.1: ὡς οὐκ εἰκὸς Ἀθηναίοις . . . διὰ μάχης ἐλθεῖν.

("It is not reasonable for the Athenians ... to do"—to go through—
"battle.")

6.60.3: βεβαιοτέραν γὰρ αὐτῷ σωτηρίαν εἶναι ὁμολογήσαντι μετ᾽
ἀδείας ἢ ἀρνηθέντι διὰ δίκης ἐλθεῖν.

("For there was greater safety for him to stand"—to go through—"trial
if he confessed with impunity than if he denied the charges.")

In these phrases, actions and experiences are viewed as areas; the
performing or enduring of them, as the act of passing through them.
We may be all the more certain that Thucydides thought of these
phrases in this way in view of a sentence in 7.24.3: οἱ γὰρ Συρακόσιοι

ναυσὶν αὐτόθι ἐφορμοῦντες ἐκώλυον, καὶ διὰ μάχης ἤδη ἐγίγνοντο αἱ ἐσκομιδαί. ("For the Syracusans blockading us there with ships prevented"—sc. the importation of supplies—"and deliveries were through battle.") Here both the underlying spatial meaning and the abstract idea are suggested; deliveries literally went through an area of battle and were also in an abstract sense accomplished by going through the experience of battle.

Thucydides and other writers sometimes use *dia* with the genitive in a modal sense so that the *dia* phrase as a whole is equivalent to an adverb. Philologists differ in explaining this phrase. Some, e.g., Harrison, whose discussion is quoted below, connect it to phrases of the *ienai dia machês* type, which we have just examined. Others, e.g., Schwyzer, 2.452, connect it with instrumental phrases, which will be discussed below. In either case, the manner in which an action is done (rather than the action itself) is conceived of as an area through which the doer passes. In Thucydides, this modal usage is mostly limited to phrases equivalent to the adverb, *tacheôs*, i.e., *dia tachous*, which occurs in 1.63.2; 2.18.4, 85.4; 3.18.1, 109.3; 4.25.2, 29.1, 85.2, 106.4; 6.69.1, 79.3, 98.2, 104.1; 7.22.2, 29.2; 8.2.1, 12.3, and 15.2, and *dia tacheôn*, which occurs in 1.80.3; 3.13.2; 4.8.4, 96.1, 125.4; 6.66.2; 8.101.1, and 101.3.

It is important to note that not only the frequency of *dia tachous* (= *tacheôs*) but also the spatial meaning of *dia* dictate that modal *dia* phrases be used in adverbial rather than adjectival phrases. Adverbial modification may be thought of as a state *through* which a doer passes in going from the beginning of an action to its conclusion; adjectival modification suggests a state *in* which the subject is located. Thus for most of the remaining modal *dia* phrases, which are adverbial, Thucydides has corresponding adjectival phrases in *en*:

1.17.1: προορώμενοι ἔς τε τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἐς τὸ ἴδιον οἶκον αὔξειν δι' ἀσφαλείας.

cf. 2.75.5: ὥστε τοὺς ἐργαζομένους . . . μήτε πυρφόροις οἰστοῖς βάλλεσθαι ἐν ἀσφαλείᾳ τε εἶναι.

7.40.3: οἱ δὲ διὰ πολλοῦ θορύβου καὶ . . . οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ἐσβάντες.

cf. 7.81.4: ἐν πολλῷ αὐτός καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦσαν.

1.42.4: τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἀδικεῖν . . . ἐχυρωτέρα δύναμις ἢ . . . διὰ κινδύνων τὸ πλέον ἔχειν.

cf. 3.56.4: τότε ὅτε ἐν μείζονι κινδύνῳ ἦτε.

Dia phrases also designate instrumental relationships.   In a usage that is readily intelligible metaphorically and paralleled by the use of "through" in English, *dia* with the genitive designates what might be called personal instrumental relationships or ones of intermediate agency, e.g., Thucydides 2.2.3 : ἔπραξαν δὲ ταῦτα δι᾿ Εὐρυμάχου . . . ἀνδρὸς Θηβαίων δυνατωτάτου.   ("They"—sc. pro–Theban Plataeans —"arranged these things"—sc. the occupation of Plataea—"through Eurymachus, the most influential of the Thebans.")   The usage also occurs in 5.43.2; 6.89.2; 8.12.2 and 17.4.   In each case, an action initiated in one place culminates elsewhere after having passed through an intermediary.

Dia with the genitive is also used of impersonal instruments.   This usage does not occur in Homer and is much more common in koine texts than in classical ones.   It is not paralleled by any common use of "through" in English.   Among classical authors the usage seems to have originated with the expression, *echein dia cheiros* or *cheirôn*, "to hold by hand" and sometimes "to control," e.g., Aeschylus *Suppliants* 193, Sophocles *Antigone* 1258, Aristophanes *Wasps* 597, Thucydides 2.13.2 and 76.4, Euripides *Hecuba* 673.   It should be noted that this expression may be interpreted spatially, since most things held in the hand, e.g., spears, protrude from either end of the hand and so may be said to be held (extending) through the hand.

Apparently, *echein dia cheiros* lies at the origin of the instrumental use of *dia*; for of the small number of other instrumental *dia* phrases in classical texts a considerable percentage are closely analogous to *echein dia cheiros*.   Thus Sophocles has *di' hosiôn cherôn thigôn* (*OC* 470) and *dia cherôn labein* (*Antigone* 916); Euripides, *dia glossês echein* (*Andromache* 95).

In any event, all of the phrases so far discussed can be accounted for by the modern approach.   In many of the phrases, awareness of *dia*'s basic spatial meaning illuminates its particular meaning in context; in none of them is there any contradiction between *dia*'s basic spatial meaning and its intended meaning in context.   We come now, however, to two passages in Thucydides where *dia* plus the genitive is used in a way that cannot, in my opinion, be plausibly accounted for by the modern approach.   The first passage is 6.34.1–2.   Hermocrates advises the Syracusans on preparations against the Athenian invasion:

ἔς τε τὴν ἄλλην Σικελίαν πέμπωμεν πρέσβεις δηλοῦντες ὡς κοινὸς ὁ κίνδυνος, καὶ ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ὅπως ἢ ξυμμαχίαν ποιώμεθα ἡμῖν ἢ μὴ δέχωνται Ἀθηναίους. δοκεῖ δέ μοι καὶ ἐς Καρχηδόνα ἄμεινον εἶναι πέμψαι. οὐ γὰρ ἀνέλπιστον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀιεὶ διὰ φόβου εἰσὶ μή ποτε Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ἔλθωσιν.

("And let us send ambassadors into the rest of Sicily to demonstrate that the danger is common to all, and into Italy either to create an alliance or at least to prevent them from receiving the Athenians. And it seems to me preferable also to send ambassadors to Carthage. For it is not outside their expectations, rather they are always fearful that the Athenians might sometime might attack their city.")

The second such passage is 6.59.2. Thucydides describes the situation in Athens after the murder of Hipparchus:

τοῖς δ᾽ Ἀθηναίοις χαλεπωτέρα μετὰ τοῦτο ἡ τυραννὶς κατέστη καὶ ὁ Ἱππίας διὰ φόβου ἤδη ὢν τῶν πολιτῶν πολλοὺς ἔκτεινε.

("The tyranny was much harsher for the Athenians after that, and Hippias being even more fearful killed many of the citizens.")

The phrase, *einai dia phobou*, has been explained in two different ways. It has been derived from the modal uses of *dia* with the genitive and from its instrumental uses. The first sort of explanation was developed in detail by G. Harrison, *A Treatise on the Greek Prepositions* (Philadelphia 1858) 158:

If ... *dia machês*, "through, by way of, fighting," serves to mark the manner or circumstances of an action, it is to be admitted equally that *dia phobou* attached to a verb of existence, as *einai*, may serve to mark the state or condition of the being of a person namely, by expressing that "through" which, or by the way of which, being or existence obtains a peculiar state or condition.

There are two deficiencies in this explanation. First, it is apparently felt to be consistent with the principles of the modern approach to impute to prepositions general meanings acquired in the course of being used figuratively. In such instances, the influence of the preposition's basic, spatial meaning is sometimes very slight. Thus Harrison argues that *dia* has acquired the capacity of expressing manner in general, i.e., it has acquired a modal meaning. There is, however, a difficulty here. The general meaning that *dia* plus the genitive acquires, possibly on the basis of phrases like *elthein dia machês*, is that

of an adverb, as has been amply demonstrated from Thucydidean usage. Harrison conceals this difficulty by rendering the simple cop-ula, *einai*, as if it were the description of a process, "to acquire a state of being," and therefore properly modified by an adverbial phrase. Indeed, it might be argued that *einai* is sometimes modified by an adverb and consequently that it was the adverbial meaning of *dia* with the genitive that Thucydides had in mind in writing *einai dia phobou*, i.e., = *einai phoberôs*. The difficulty with that is that the use of adverbs with *einai* is limited to well defined circumstances, none of which is present in the passages under consideration. *LSJ* (s.v. *eimi*) list only three instances in which it is normal to complement *einai* with an adverb: (1) where the adverb is the equivalent of a predicate noun; (2) where the subject of *einai* is a denominalized action, e.g., *komidê*; (3) where *einai* is used impersonally. Moreover, there is no instance of *einai phoberôs* in Thucydides nor, to my knowledge, in any classical text. On the other hand, that Thucydides considered the phrase, *dia phobou*, adjectival is suggested by comparing 6.59.2, above, with his description of the same circumstance in 2.3.4: ἐν νυκτὶ φοβερώτεροι ὄντες.

The second difficulty is common to any attempt to explain the phrase, *einai dia phobou*, according to the principles of the modern approach. We have seen that since Devarius' time the central assumption of the modern approach is that whenever a preposition occurs, its basic (= spatial) meaning is also somehow present. In instances where a preposition is said to have acquired a general meaning, it is difficult to understand precisely what this assertion means. It seems reasonable, however, to establish the following minimal criterion for the truth of the assertion: a preposition's meaning in context should not contradict the clear implications of its spatial meaning.

Now it happens that we are able to ascertain the spatial meaning of *einai dia* and to say with some assurance that this meaning is not com-patible with the intended meaning of *einai dia phobou*. The meaning of *einai dia pollou* (sc. *chôriou*), for example, is not "to be in or extended through a large space" but rather "to *be* through, on the far side of, a large, intervening area." If this idea were present in either instance of *einai dia phobou*, Thucydides' meaning would have been that Hippias or the Carthaginians were "through fear," that they had once been

afraid but were no longer so. Thucydides clearly did not mean this;
he meant that Hippias and the Carthaginians were *in* the state of fear.
Thus it seems that if the principles of the modern approach have any
meaning at all, they are not applicable to *einai dia phobou*.

Schwyzer (2.451), whose exposition contains a minimum of com-
mentary, seems to derive all the abstract uses of *dia* with the genitive
from its instrumental use. This approach does not seem any more
plausible than Harrison's. It is no more normal to modify *einai* with
instrumental phrases than with adverbial ones. Nor does this deriva-
tion solve the problem of assimilating *dia*'s basic, spatial meaning to its
meaning in *einai dia phobou*.

One might develop other explanations for *einai dia phobou* along the
lines dictated by the modern approach. It does not, however, seem
likely that such explanations would make *dia*'s spatial meaning seem
particularly appropriate to this phrase. More important, it is demon-
strable that this phrase belongs to a cohesive group of *dia*-genitive
phrases. Members of this group occur not only in Thucydides but
also in the works of several contemporaries and near contemporaries,
i.e., Herodotus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, and Xenophon.
It is possible to arrange these phrases like a geneaology and to show how
one phrase led by analogy to the creation of another. From this it will
emerge that the use of *dia* throughout is best explained on the assump-
tion that it came to be used as a substitute for *en* with the dative.

The evidence for these assertions is unwieldy. I give first the group
of phrases in question. They are numbered to facilitate correlation
with the genealogical chart that follows. The significance of the paral-
lel phrases with *en* plus the dative will be clarified in the sequel.

(I.) Aristophanes *Birds* 211: (ὕμνων) οὓς διὰ θείου στόματος θρηνεῖς.

ibid. 220–22, διὰ δ' ἀθανάτων στμάτων χωρεῖ . . . ὀλολυγή.

Euripides *Suppliants* 111–12, λέγ(ε) . . . πέρας γὰρ οὐδὲν μὴ γλώσσης ἰόν.
("Speak . . . for nothing will happen except through the tongue.")

(II.) Thucydides 2.76.4: ἀφίεσαν τὴν δοκὸν χαλαραῖς ταῖς ἁλύσεσι καὶ οὐ διὰ
χειρὸς ἔχοντες.

("They released the beam and let the chains go slack rather than con-
trolling them by hand.")

Sophocles *Antigone* 1258: μνῆμ' ἐπίσημον διὰ χειρὸς ἔχων.

ibid. 1297: ἔχω μὲν ἐν χείρεσσιν ἀρτίως τέκνον.

idem, OC 1698–99: ἦν φίλον, ὁπότε γε καὶ τὸν ἐν χεροῖν κατεῖχον.
("It was pleasing when I at least held him in my arms.")

Euripides, *Electra* 506–7: πατέρα τὸν ἐμόν, ὃν ποτ᾽ ἐν χεροῖν ἔχων . . .
ἔθρεψας.

idem, Bacchae 737–38: τὴν μὲν . . . πόριν μυκωμένην ἔχουσαν ἐν χεροῖν.

(III A.) Aristophanes *Wasps* 596–97: Κλέων . . . μόνον ἡμᾶς οὐ περιτρώγει
ἀλλὰ φυλάττει διὰ χειρὸς ἔχων.

Thucydides 2.13.2: τὴν πόλιν ἐσελθόντας φυλάσσειν, καὶ τὸ ναυτικόν, ᾗπερ
ἰσχύουσιν, ἐξαρτύεσθαι, τά τε τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ χειρὸς ἔχειν.

Herodotus 1.35.1: ἔχοντος δέ οἱ ἐν χερσὶ τοῦ παιδὸς τὸν γάμον.

idem. 7.5.2: εἰ τὸ μὲν νῦν ταῦτα πρήσσοις τά περ ἐν χερσὶ ἔχεις.

idem. 7.47.1: χρηστὰ ἔχοντες πρήγματα ἐν χερσί.

Euripides *Electra* 610–11: ἐν χειρὶ τῇ σῇ πάντ᾽ ἔχεις . . . πατρῷον οἶκον
καὶ πόλιν λαβεῖν σέθεν.

(III B.) *idem, Andromache* 93–95: ἐμπέφυκε γὰρ γυναιξὶ τέρψις τῶν παρεστ-
ώτων κακῶν ἀνὰ στόμ᾽ ἀεὶ καὶ διὰ γλώσσας ἔχειν.
("It is natural for women to derive pleasure from their troubles by talking
about them.")

Xenophon *Cyropaedia* 1.4.25: οἵ τε ἄλλοι πάντες τὸν Κῦρον διὰ στόματος
εἶχον.

Herodotus 3.157.4: Ζώπυρον εἶχον ἐν στόμασι αἰνέοντες.

idem. 6.136.1: Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ . . . Μιλτιάδεα . . . εἶχον ἐν στόμασι.

(IV A.) Thucydides 7.8.3: ὁ δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὸ στρατόπεδον διὰ φυλακῆς μᾶλλον
ἤδη ἔχων ἢ δι᾽ ἑκουσίων κινδύνων.

idem, 8.51.1: χρῆναι τειχίζειν τε Σάμον ὡς τάχιστα καὶ τἆλλα ἐν φυλακῇ.
(ἔχειν ἐν φυλακῇ also occurs in 3.34.3; 4.14.5 and 129.1.)

Herodotus 7.207.1: ἐδόκεε ἐλθοῦσι ἐς Πελοπόννησον τὸν Ἰσθμὸν ἔχειν ἐν
φυλακῇ. (ἔχειν ἐν φυλακῇ also occurs in 1.24.1, 160.4; 5.77.3; 7.208.2;
8.23.1 and 40.2.

(IV B.) Thucydides 2.22.2: τήν τε πόλιν ἐφύλασσε καὶ δι᾽ ἡσυχίας . . . εἶχεν.

Herodotus 5.93.2: οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τῶν συμμάχων τέως μὲν σφέας αὐτοὺς
εἶχον ἐν ἡσυχίῃ.

Euripides *Phaethon* 110 (= fr. 773, 62): ἔχειν χρὴ στόμ᾽ ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ.

(IV C.) Thucydides 2.60.4: ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς . . . δι᾽ αἰτίας ἔχετε.

idem. 2.59.2: τὸν μὲν Περικλέα ἐν αἰτίᾳ εἶχον. (ἐ. ἐν αἰτίᾳ also occurs in
1.35.4; 5.60.2, 4, 63.1, 65.5 and 7.81.1.)

Herodotus 5.106.2: ὅρα μὴ . . . σεωυτὸν ἐν αἰτίῃ σχῇς.

(IV D.) Thucydides 2.37.1: οὐ δι' ὀργῆς τὸν πέλας . . . ἔχοντες.

idem. 2.64.1: μήτε ἐμε δι' ὀργῆς ἔχετε.

idem. 2.21.3: τὸν Περικλέα ἐν ὀργῇ εἶχον. (ἔχειν ἐν ὀργῇ also occurs in 2.18.5 and 65.3.)

(IV E.) Euripides IT 683: ταῦτ' οὖν φοβοῦμαι καὶ δι' αἰσχύνης ἔχω.

Xenophon Cyropaedia 6.1.36: ὁρῶ σε . . . φοβούμενόν τε ἐμε καὶ ἐν αἰσχύνης δεινῶς ἔχοντα.

(V A.) Thucydides 2.81.4: οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες τεταγμένοι τε προσῆσαν καὶ διὰ φυλακῆς ἔχοντες.

(V B.) Thucydides 5.45.5: ὡς ἤκουσαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος πεπραγμένον, εὐθὺς δι' ὀργῆς εἶχον.

(VI A.) Herodotus 2.206.2: οὐκ ἂν ἐθελήσεις . . . ἡσθχίης εἶναι.

Xenophon Apology 2.9.8: ὁ Κρίτων ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ ἦν.

(VI B.) Thucydides 6.34.2 and 59.2 (v. p. 395 above).

ibid. 3.79.3, (πόλιν) καίπερ ἐν πολλῇ ταραχῇ καὶ φόβῳ ὄντας.

In studying these phrases, I have assumed that they are representative of larger groups of similar phrases that formed a part of the working vocabulary of each author involved.   On this assumption it is possible to suppose that a phrase occurring only in Thucydides, for example, was created by analogy with a phrase occurring only in Aristophanes but presumably being a part of Thucydides' repertoire too.   This assumption seems reasonable in itself and is regularly implicit in grammatical and lexicographic expositions.

Each of these phrases, except two, may be explained as an analogue to one of the other phrases in the group.   By this I mean that each phrase is identical in meaning to another phrase except for one change. Three kinds of change are involved: transference from the abstract to the concrete; reduction from the general to the particular; change of the force of the expression as a whole from transitive to intransitive.

On the following page, I have presented a hypothetical derivation for each phrase by means of a chart.   The numbered rows are meant to represent different degrees of distance between the basic spatial meaning of dia and its intended meaning in each phrase.   In row I, dia is used in a way for which its basic meaning is uniquely appropriate.

(I)   ἰέναι / διὰ / στόματος

(II)   ἔχειν / διὰ χειρός

(III)   ἔχειν / διὰ χειρός / (=φυλάττειν)   ἔχειν / διὰ / στόματός

(IV)   ἔχειν διὰ / φυλακῆς   ἔχειν διὰ / ἡσυχίας   ἔχειν / διὰ αἰτίας   ἔχειν / διὰ ὀργῆς   ἔχειν / διὰ αἰσχύνης

(V)   ἔχειν / (=εἶναι) / διὰ / φυλακῆς   ἔχειν / (=εἶναι) / διὰ / ὀργῆς

(VI)   εἶναι διὰ / ἡσυχίας   εἶναι / διὰ φόβου

In rows II to V, its spatial meaning is still possibly present, but the hypothesis that *dia* is intended rather as a substitute for *en* becomes progressively more inviting. In row VI, *dia*'s basic meaning seems to contradict its meaning in context, which seems only explicable on the assumption that *dia* is meant as a substitute for *en*.

Let us now take up each model and analogue in turn. The phrases of row *I* present no problem. As has been stated, it is quite in accord with *dia*'s basic meaning to speak of sounds coming *dia* the mouth. These phrases are included only because they seem to have influenced the creation of other phrases in the group.

The phrases of row II describe the literal action of holding something by (*dia*) hand. This usage seems compatible with *dia*'s basic meaning. In this case, however, *dia* has become approximately synonymous with

en plus the dative.   As the parallel phrases from Sophocles and Euripides show, authors of this period tended to use *echein en cheroin* rather more frequently than *echein dia cheiros*.   The two expressions are certainly close in meaning.   Thus when an author chose to use one, it is probable that the other passed through his mind.   This in turn would create at least a suggestion of equivalence between *dia* and *en* with the dative when used to complement *echein*.   It remains to be seen whether this suggestion or some other inference from the phrase predominated when analogous phrases were created.   It might be supposed that *echein dia cheiros* would do no more than re-inforce an author's feeling for the spatial meaning of *dia* or, perhaps, suggest that *dia* might be used to designate any instrumental relationship.

In the phrases numbered   III A, *echein dia cheiros* is transferred from literal to abstract contexts.   The phrase as a whole suggests control over or active interest in affairs, which the subject figuratively holds in hand. It should be noted that *en* with the dative is also used in that way.

The phrases numbered III B seem to have been influenced by two other sets of phrases.   First, the combination *dia stomatos* was already familiar from its literal use with verbs of motion or of speaking. Second, it is inviting to suppose that *echein dia stomatos* was associated in the minds of the authors who used it with *echein dia cheiros*.   The latter expresses any sort of actual influence over something; the former mere talk about it.   This contrast seems to be implicit in Euripides' phrase in *Andromache* 95: women cannot exercise control over their misfortunes, but they do derive some comfort from complaining about them.

Euripides' phrase is interesting in another respect.   He has substituted *glôssês* for *stomatos* apparently for the sake of variety.   This substitution suggests that the spatial meaning of *dia* is losing its influence complaints can literally come through the mouth but not through the tongue.

With respect to *echein dia stomatos* in general, it is possible to suppose that here as in *dia cheiros*, *dia* was used to designate an instrumental relationship.   On the other hand, the parallels from Herodotus show that the phrase would also suggest the equivalence of *dia* and *en* when complementing *echein*.

Aristophanes *Wasps* 596–97 (III A) shows that one type of control or

interest suggested by *echein dia cheiros* consisted in keeping something under guard. Therefore, the phrases numbered IV A, *echein dia phulakês*, represent a way of making *echein dia cheiros* more specific and are in that sense analogous to it. The analogy, however, would be somewhat evasive, if *dia cheiros* were understood in light of either *dia*'s spatial meaning or of its instrumental function. The spatial relationship between a hand and that which is held differs from the relationship between a guard or the act of guarding and that which is guarded; nor is guarding an instrument in quite the same sense that a hand is. If, however, *dia cheiros* was understood as another way of saying *en cheiri*, nothing could be more natural than the creation by analogy of *echein dia phulakês* as a substitute for *echein en phulakêi*—that being by far the more normal way of expressing the idea.

The phrases *echein dia kindunôn* (IV A) and *echein dia hêsuchias* seem to invite the same sort of analysis. It is particularly clear that *echein dia hêsuchias* is not intended to express an instrumental or modal idea. The point is not that in dealing with the city Pericles used peace as an instrument to achieve some ulterior goal or that he himself acted in a peaceful manner (although he may have), but rather that he sought to keep the city *in* the state of peace.

Phrases IV C–E seem to represent specifications of the general idea of *echein dia stomatos*. Blame, anger, and reverence mostly appear in what people say. Like *echein dia stomatos* they suggest a contrast with effective control over something (*echein dia cheiros*). The influence of *dia*'s spatial meaning is difficult to perceive in these phrases. It is inviting to suppose that *dia* bears a modal meaning in *dia orgês* and *dia aischunês*, which suggest manners of acting. The modal interpretation, however, does not fit well with *echein dia aitias*, which suggests a specific action (*aitiasthai*) rather than a manner of acting, nor with *echein dia stomatos*, from which all three phrases seem to be derived. On the other hand, the interpretation, *dia = en*, fits all four phrases well.

Phrase V A represents the transformation of *echein dia phulakês* into an intransitive expression. It should be noted that *echein* used intransitively is virtually equivalent to *einai* (cf. *LSJ* s.v. *echein*). In the previous transitive phrases, one can always argue in favor of the propriety of *dia*'s spatial meaning that the action of the verb passes from the subject *through* a manner or instrument to the object. The use of *dia*

with *echein* intransitive is, therefore, another symptom of the diminishing influence of *dia*'s spatial meaning.

Phrase V B, *echein* (= *einai*) *dia orgês* represents the same sort of development and the same lessening of the influence of *dia*'s spatial meaning.

Phrase VI A, *einai dia hêsuchiês* culminates two lines of development. On the one hand, *echein* intransitive is used by analogy with *echein* transitive, while *einai* is a synonym for *echein* intransitive. On the other hand, *echein dia cheiros*, "to control," suggests guarding (*echein dia phulakês*) and that, as Thucydides 2.22.2 shows, is associated with keeping something peaceful. The use of *dia* throughout the evolution of this phrase makes sense if it is interpreted as having become a substitute for *en*. It seems impossible to make the spatial meaning of *dia* correspond to its intended meaning in *einai dia hêsuchiês*. The *dia* phrase might be taken as modal, i.e., adverbial in *echein dia hêsuchiês*, but not in *einai dia hêsuchiês*.

That brings us back to where we began, phrase VI B, *einai dia phobou*. Thucydides' phrase, like Herodotus', seems to have grown out of the intransitive use of *echein* complemented by *dia*. With respect to the particular meaning of the phrase, *echein dia stomatos* suggests several attitudes, among them reverence (*echein dia aishunês*). Euripides *IT* 683 and Xenophon *Cyropaedia* 6.1.36 (IV E) both suggest that that is virtually synonymous with fear. As with *einai dia hêsuchiês*, the development of *einai dia phobou* seems quite logical on the assumption that somewhere along the line *echein dia* was understood as just another way of saying *echein en*.

To review: I have presented a group of *dia*-genitive phrases from Thucydides and other authors. The phrases seem close enough to each other in meaning to justify the assumption that they were created one from the other by analogy or, at least, are typical of the phrases that were actually involved in this process. Even though one phrase as a whole may be explained as an analogue to another, it remains necessary to discover how each element in the phrase was interpreted. In the phrases under discussion, it appears that *dia* could not have been consistently interpreted either in terms of its spatial meaning or in terms of any one general function, e.g., to designate manner or instrument. In two of the basic phrases in the group, *echein dia cheiros* and

echein dia stomatos, however, *dia* with the genitive was used in such a way as to suggest that it was little more than a substitute for *en* with the dative.   The assumption that in the phrases derived from these two phrases, *dia* is intended as a substitute for *en* makes the meaning of these derivative phrases quite clear and consistent with their contexts.   It appears in this instance, therefore, that the substitution hypothesis is capable of providing a more economical explanation of the origin of some phrases of abstract meaning than is the modern approach.   This is worthwhile in itself.   It also provides encouragement for the attempt to solve problems in interpreting abstract phrases with the help of the substitution hypothesis and of the scholiasts who used it.

Thucydides 1.122.1

Let us then consider an *anti*-gloss from Thucydides' scholia to a phrase of abstract meaning, which occurs in 1.122.1: ἥκιστα γὰρ πόλεμος ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς χωρεῖ, αὐτὸς δὲ ἀφ' αὑτοῦ τὰ πολλὰ τεχνᾶται πρὸς τὸ παρατυγχάνον: ἐν ᾧ ὁ μὲν εὐοργήτως αὐτῷ προσομιλήσας βεβαιότερος, ὁ δ' ὀργισθεὶς περὶ αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐλάσσω πταίει.—ἀντὶ τοῦ διότι. ("For war does not at all proceed according to plans, but rather devises many of its actions on the spur of the moment, *in which* the person who has associated with it in good temper is relatively safe, while the man who has become angered over it meets with disaster no less often.—a substitute for *because of which*.")

The phrase to which the gloss refers, *en hôi*, occurs forty-seven times in Thucydides.   Its occurrences may be divided according to whether it is used to express spatial, temporal or abstract relationships and sub-divided, within the first two divisions, according to the nature of its antecedent:

I. SPATIAL

A. Explicit antecedents that designate places (11 times): 1.52.1 *(τὸν ἐν τοῖς Συβότοις λιμένα, ἐν ᾧ οἱ Κορίνθιοι ὥρμουν)*; 2.86.4; 3.96.1; 4.45.2 and 92.1; 5.60.3; 6.34.6 and 66.1 and 58.2; 7.77.5; 8.11.1.

B. Implicit antecedent *chôrion* (3 times): 2.43.2 *(ἐλάμβανον καὶ τὸν τάφον ἐπισημότατον οὐκ ἐν ᾧ κεῖνται μᾶλλον, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ ἡ δόξα αὐτῶν . . . καταλείπεται)*; 7.70.3

C. Explicit antecedents analogues to places (3 times): 1.139.1 (τὸ περὶ
Μεγαρέων ψήφισμα . . . ἐν ᾧ εἴρητο αὐτοὺς μὴ χρῆσθαι τοῖς λιμέσι);
4.98.4; 5.64.3.

II. TEMPORAL

A. Explicit antecedent *kairos* or *chronos* (5 times): 1.43.2 (τοῦτον ἐκεῖνον
εἶναι τὸν καιρὸν ἐν ᾧ ὅ τε ὑπουργῶν φίλος μάλιστα καὶ ὁ ἀντιστὰς
ἐχθρός.); 6.61.2; 7.2.4 and 51.1; 8.87.1.

B. Explicit antecedents that represent periods of time (4 times): 1.21.2
(ὁ πόλεμος οὗτος, καίπερ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἂν πολεμῶσι τὸν
παρόντα αἰεὶ μέγιστον κρινόντων δηλώσει μείζων γεγενημένος);
1.101.2; 2.1; 7.14.3.

C. Implicit antecedent *chronos* (11 times)　1. with the indicative, "when,"
(9 times): 1.39.3 (οὓς χρῆν, ὅτε ἀσφαλέστατοι ἦσαν, τότε προσιέναι,
καὶ μὴ ἐν ᾧ ἡμεῖς μὲν ἠδικάμεθα . . .) twice; 2.11.6 and 86.1; 3.39.2,
39.3, 40.3 and 84.2; 5.16.1; 6.92.4.　2. with the subjunctive, "whenever"
(2 times): 1.37.4 (ὅπως ἐν ᾧ μὲν ἂν κρατῶσι, βιάζωνται); 1.42.1.

Besides the passage under discussion, there remain eleven instances
of *en hôi* used to designate an abstract relationship.　Of these, six will
not concern us directly.　It will suffice to indicate their essential nature.
In three of these instances, *en hôi* might be loosely translated, "in dis-
cussing a topic in respect to which": 2.35.2 (χαλεπὸν γὰρ τὸ μετρίως
εἰπεῖν ἐν ᾧ μόλις καὶ ἡ δόκησις τῆς ἀληθείας βεβαιοῦται.　Arnold
translates: "For it is hard to speak with exact propriety on a subject
where, besides its other difficulties, it is hard to convince the hearers that
what you say to them is the truth."), 4.17.2; 8.72.1.　In two instances,
en hôi might be translated, "in what condition": 7.11.1 (καιρὸς . . .
μαθόντας ὑμᾶς ἐν ᾧ ἐσμὲν βουλεύσασθαι.), 7.14.3.　Finally, *en hôi* is
used in 4.18.2 apparently to mean "in respect to which": ἐπάθομεν
αὐτὸ . . . ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν αἰεὶ ὑπαρχόντων γνώμῃ σφαλέντες, ἐν ᾧ πᾶσι
τὸ αὐτὸ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει.　Classen offers the following explanation:
hinsichtlich welcher Sache (nämlich in dem apo tôn aiei uparchontôn gnômê
sphalênai) . . . *alle sich in gleicher Lage befinden.*

It is apparent that none of the *en hôi* phrases catalogued so far is
analogous to the one under discussion, i.e., in 1.122.1.　In that instance,
en hôi is used to suggest some sort of causal relationship between the
preceding and following clauses.　This is, of course, the general force

of the gloss, *anti tou dioti*. Whatever one may think of the gloss's
additional implication that, properly interpreted, *en hôi* does not convey
Thucydides' intended meaning, it will nevertheless be conceded that
dioti would not have misrepresented his meaning in any substantial
way: "War is capricious; *therefore*, an even-tempered man fares better
in association with it." *En hôi* does not, however, bear a causal sense
in any of the usages catalogued so far. Therefore, it seems unlikely
that the use of *en* that Thucydides had in mind in 1.122.1 is represented
by any of these phrases.

In the remaining five instances of *en hôi*, the phrase is clearly causal
in meaning. It carries with it, however, an additional nuance that
reflects the basic, spatial meaning of *en*: localization within certain,
significant bounds. In each instance, a previous clause alludes to one
of two or more possible situations. The situation alluded to ten func-
tions as the antecedent of *hôi*. The *en hôi* clause as a whole indicates a
consequence that occurs as part of this situation: it localizes the necessity
of a particular consequence within one of several, possible situations.
The *en hôi* clause may be paraphrased as a conditional sentence without
distorting its meaning. The phrase itself is usually equivalent to "in
which event" in English.

This causal use of *en hôi* occurs in the following sentences:

1.122.3: . . . δουλείαν· ὃ καὶ λόγῳ ἐνδοιασθῆναι αἰσχρὸν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ
καὶ πόλεις τοσάσδε ὑπὸ μιᾶς κακοπαθεῖν. ἐν ᾧ ἢ δικαίως δοκοῖμεν ἂν
πάσχειν ἢ διὰ δειλίαν ἀνέχεσθαι.

(". . . slavery: an issue about which it would be disgraceful for the Pelo-
ponnesus to hesitate even in debate, as it would in the case of so many cities
being victimized by one. In which event"—if we should hesitate, the
result would be that—"we would either seem to be suffering justly or to
be enduring mistreatment because of cowardice.")

4.20.1: καλῶς . . . ἔχει ἀμφοτέροις ἡ ξυναλλαγή, πρίν τι ἀνήκεστον διὰ
μέσου γενόμενον ἡμᾶς καταλαβεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἀνάγκη ἀΐδιον ὑμῖν ἔχθραν ἔχειν.

("A treaty is advantageous for both of us, before something intolerable
befalls us in the interim, in which event"—if some such thing should
happen, the result would be that—"we would be forced to have undying
enmity against you.")

6.18.4: ἢ τῆς Ἑλλάδος . . . πάσας . . . ἄρξομεν, ἢ κακώσομέν γγε
Συρακοσίους, ἐν ᾧ καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ὠφελησόμεθα.

("Either we will rule all Greece or we will at least weaken the Syracusans, in which event"—even if we only do this, the result will be that—"we ourselves and our allies will be benefited.")

7.68.2: ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἦλθον δουλωσόμενοι, ἐν ᾧ, εἰ κατώρθωσαν ἀνδράσι μὲν ἂν τ᾽ ἄλγιστα προσέθεσαν, παισὶ δὲ καὶ γυναιξὶ τὰ ἀπρεπέστατα.

("They attacked our land to enslave it, in which event, if they had succeeded"—the result would have been that—"they would have inflicted great pain on the men and great disgrace on the women and children.")

8.86.4: ὡρμημένων γὰρ τῶν ἐν Σάμῳ Ἀθηναίων πλεῖν ἐπὶ σφᾶς αὐτούς, ἐν ᾧ σαφέστατα Ἰωνίαν καὶ Ἑλλήσποντον εὐθὺς εἶχον οἱ πολέμιοι, κωλυτὴς γένεσθαι.

("For with the Athenians in Samos rising up to sail against their compatriots, in which event"—if they had done this, the result would have been that—"the enemy would quite clearly have taken control of Ionia and the Hellespont, he prevented them.")

When we return to 1.122.1 with these five phrases in mind, we see that if *en hôi* is to be interpreted in its proper and normal sense, the clause that it introduces should be taken as equivalent to a present, general condition: "War devises many things on the spur of the moment, in which event—"when war is thus devising things, the result is that"—the man who has associated with it in an even-tempered manner is relatively safe, while the man who has grown angry over the war meets with disaster no less frequently."

There is no difficulty with this interpretation so far as the one sentence that we have considered is concerned.   There is nothing wrong with a speaker on the subject of war mentioning that when war acts capriciously, even-tempered men do better.   It is, however, difficult to maintain precisely this interpretation of the sentence, when one considers the context in which the sentence occurs.   A Corinthian at the Second Congress of Lacedaemon is urging the Peloponnesians to vote for war.   In 1.121, he lists reasons for optimism in entering a war against Athens.   In the first part of 1.122, he gives a final reason for optimism: there are many different ways to strike against Athenian power, e.g., to induce Athenian dependencies to revolt.   The speaker adds that other similar opportunities will appear such that a person could not at that time foresee.   Then comes the sentence under consideration.

In this context, "for ... war devises many things on the spur of the moment" is clearly a metaphorical way of saying that war presents unexpected opportunities to strike against one's enemy or exposes unforeseen weaknesses in the enemy position, rather than a way of saying simply that war is generally capricious. The former assertion is relevant to an argument on behalf of optimism and is an expansion of the previous sentence (to which it is connected by the particle, *gar*), while the latter is neither. If then *en hôi* is to be interpreted as bearing its proper and normal meaning, it appears that the speaker is assuring his allies that when the vagaries of the forthcoming war expose, as they assuredly will, unforeseen weaknesses in the Athenian position, then they, the allies, will probably be able to avert disaster if they have been even-tempered in conducting the war. That is not a sufficiently sanguine prediction to impute to a pro-war speaker.

This difficulty has been recognized by Arnold who, despite *gar*, treats the sentence as an isolated remark about the nature of war: "The connection of the argument is rather obscure. Perhaps the speaker wishes to disclaim being influenced by passion in urging war against Athens so vehemently." On this interpretation, the Corinthian argument might be paraphrased thus: "Be optimistic for the preceding reasons and also because the war will reveal unanticipated ways to attack Athens. It might also be mentioned that when war is acting unpredictably whether for better or for worse, people who have entered into it without passion do better." This is not a very satisfactory interpretation, but it does seem to be the best that can be obtained so long as the phrase, *en hôi*, is interpreted according to the modern approach. (One of the conspicuous shortcomings of this interpretation is the absence in the text of any indication of a transition from the contemplation of favorable surprises in the course of the war to that of unexpected turns of any sort and particularly unfavorable ones. Finley in his translation supplies this indication by rendering *paratunchanon* as "emergency," as if that word in Greek, like emergency in English, sufficed by itself to indicate unfavorable surprises and thus to create the needed shift in focus. This translation, however, is not justified by Thucydidean usage, in which participial forms of *paratunchanein* suggest favorable as well as unfavorable surprises; cf. 1.76.2.)

The basic deficiency of the modern approach appears in this. So

long as one has the modern approach alone in mind, he feels compelled
to assimilate the meaning of *en hôi*, whenever it occurs, to its proper
meaning as far as the immediate context will allow.   In 1.122.1, this
procedure results in destroying the over-all coherency of Thucydides'
argument—as Arnold's remarks show.   The assumption that (outside
of idiomatic expressions and the exigencies of the particular context)
a word's proper meaning is the only important factor affecting Thucy-
dides' choice of words thus makes his thought processes seem abnorm-
ally subtle.   The glossator's interpretation, by recognizing the casual
interchange of similar expressions, restores intelligibility to Thucydides'
argument.

   The force of the gloss, *en hôi anti tou dioti*, is that in this passage
Thucydides did not use *en hôi* in its proper sense, but rather as a sub-
stitute for the expression of related meaning, *dioti*, "because of which,"
to indicate an ordinary causal connection between a general truth and
one of its consequences.   On this interpretation, the Corinthian argu-
ment makes perfectly good sense and may thus be integrated with the
rest of its passage: "Be optimistic for the preceding reasons and also
because the war will reveal unanticipated ways to attack Athens.   For
war provides many unexpected opportunities.   Therefore, a person
who enters upon it in a cool, optimistic way (despite the apparent power
of the enemy) is relatively safe (since the war will provide opportunities
to offset such power) while the person who becomes angry over the
war (resents its inception in the feeling that the odds are against him)
does not thereby diminish his chances of failure."   It might be noted
that Jowett's translation implicitly accepts the glossator's interpretation
of *en hōi*, even though it differs in some respects from the interpretation
just offered: "For war . . . strikes out a path for itself when the moment
comes.   And *therefore* he who has his temper under control in warfare
is safer far."

CONCLUSION

With the discussion of 1.122.1, we have come to the end of the argu-
ment projected for this essay.   In it I have sought to describe the mod-
ern method of analyzing the meaning of prepositional phrases and to
compare it with that of antiquity.   Subsequently, through the analysis

of a few phrases from Thucydides, I have attempted to show that the
ancient approach retains some utility as a supplement to the modern
approach. In doing this, my primary concern has been with the prin-
ciples of interpretation involved. The Thucydidean passages discussed
were selected from this point of view rather than with regard to their
own intrinsic importance.

For the future, if explanations by substitution should recover some
favor among philologists, it would be necessary to examine *anti*-
scholia to parts of speech other than prepositions both in Thucydides
and in other authors as well. Such examinations might be carried out
without the lengthy prolegomena that were necessary in this essay.

The idea of word substitution implies a certain dichotomy in one's
view of language. An author's actual words represent a higher level
of discourse, a rhetorical level, which, like an agitated surface of water,
distorts one's view of the terrain beneath, i.e., the somewhat different
set of words that the author understood. Though beyond the scope
of this essay to prove, it seems likely to me that the dichotomy implied
by the *anti*-scholia is responsible for the frequency in antiquity of para-
phrases. For us, in a philological tradition that views every word as a
unique and directly accessible carrier of meaning, the paraphrase seems
an essentially frivolous exercise. For ancient scholars, to whom an
author's actual words seemed only an approximation of the words
understood, the paraphrase was naturally a basic tool of philological
analysis, the draining off of rhetoric in order to get an undistorted view
of the author's meaning. Thus the re-introduction of explanation by
substitution into classical philology would likely bring with it renewed
interest in the venerable practice of paraphrase. It would also restore
some credit to the ancient commentators—credit appropriately restored,
I believe, since those men, despite the mistakes that riddle their work,
were in many ways closer to the classical texts than any of us can ever
hope to be.